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Introduction
At the Center of Attention: Presidents and Their Appointees
Describing the president’s appointment power, Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist 76
that “it is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice
of men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need proof, that on this point must
essentially depend the character of its administration” (1788c). This plan for filling key exec-
utive branch positions has stirred political controversy and prompted scholarly inquiry ever
since its inception at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and its initial operation
in George Washington’s first administration. Some of the earliest and most potent intra- and
inter-branch conflicts centered on the appointment power and appointees—whether between
competing factions within an administration (Cunningham 2000), or between the president
and Congress1 or the courts.2
For modern presidents, the appointment power has become even more significant due
to the parallel growth of both the expansive executive branch establishment and the civil
service system that makes direct political control of that establishment more difficult. These
appointees matter because they can influence both what agencies do—who gets services
or goods or where agencies direct their effort and attention—and how well they do it. Ap-
pointees in the modern institutional presidency have helped presidents design and implement
history-changing policy such as the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe after World War
II (Fossedal 1993), as well as having mired presidents in scandals like Watergate and the
Iran-contra affair (Milkis and Nelson 2003). And more recent events such as the debate over
1As an example of conflict between the president and Congress, the “decision of 1789,” in which Congress
passed laws creating the first cabinet departments and implied in those statutes that the Constitution
granted presidents the power to remove appointed officials, was just the first skirmish in a continuing
battle over this removal power (Calabresi and Yoo 2009).
2See e.g. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), which arose from a dispute about an appointment during
the presidential transition from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson.
1
the State Department’s review of the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline3 and the president’s
controversial appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau4 highlight the continued centrality of appointments in the political
and policy arenas.
Scholars have examined some aspects of this critical role of appointees in the modern
executive branch. Both theoretical and empirical research looks at the vetting, formal nom-
ination, and confirmation processes for Senate-confirmed appointees. Other work evaluates
the trends in appointee numbers over time, the placement of appointees across agencies,
the occurrence of extended vacancies, what the personal skills or characteristics are that
presidents value most in potential appointees, and appointees’ influence on agency-level
performance. Yet this foundation of theoretical and empirical work does not explain how
presidents prioritize their initial appointments at the beginning of an administration, what
limitations there might be on the qualifications and characteristics of appointees over an
administration, and how individual-level characteristics could influence individual and orga-
nizational performance.
My dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of appointment priorities, ap-
pointee characteristics, and appointee and agency performance. The first chapter examines
how presidential political and policy goals influence which appointed positions get filled
first; I analyze a new dataset on appointment timing in the first terms of presidents George
W. Bush and Barack Obama to test how electoral motivation combines with desire for
policy outcomes to dictate appointment priorities. Drawing on an original dataset of the
background characteristics of appointees across a complete presidential administration, the
second chapter evaluates how appointees’ education, political experience, substantive exper-
tise, and other background characteristics vary due to limited pools of potential candidates
3Eilperin, Juliet. 2013. “How much does EPA’s objection to Keystone XL matter? A lot.” Washington
Post. April 23, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/04/23/how-much-
does-epas-objection-to-keystone-xl-matter-a-lot/ April 14, 2014).
4Savage, Charlie, and Steven Greenhouse. 2013. “Court Rejects Obama Move to Fill Posts.” New York
Times: A1. January 25, 2013.
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and changing political contexts over “intra-presidential” time. The third chapter connects
the personal characteristics of agency leaders with bureaucratic performance, comparing
appointee and careerist performance at the individual and organization levels using a new
dataset built from embassy inspections conducted by the State Department’s Office of In-
spector General. These chapters, described in more detail below, extend our understanding
of how presidents make decisions in the appointment process and how these decisions affect
the performance of the federal executive establishment.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 1: Help Wanted: Presidential Priorities in the Appointments Process
In October 2010, President Obama signed into law the Pre-Election Presidential Transition
Act to provide resources and authority for major party nominees to begin transition plan-
ning between the parties’ conventions in late summer and the election in November. Upon
its introduction in April 2010, one of the act’s sponsors, George Voinovich, argued that,
“candidates taking deliberate steps to ensure a smooth transition should not be criticized as
arrogantly ‘measuring the White House drapes’ before Election Day. Such planning should
be encouraged and supported.”5 A primary motivation for the act and its predecessors is
the challenge of shifting from campaigning to governing. Once elected, presidents have to
make the transition from directing campaign organizations and managing budgets of less
than $1 billion to guiding the sprawling federal executive establishment with its 15 cabinet
departments, more than 80 independent agencies, approximately 2.6 million civilian and 1.4
million uniformed personnel,6 and annual discretionary budgets exceeding $1.3 trillion.7
5Jochum, Elizabeth Newell. 2010. “Legislation aims to improve presidential transitions.” Government
Executive. April 14, 2010. http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2010/04/legislation-aims-to-
improve-presidential-transitions/31276/ (May 3, 2014).
6Lewis, David E., and Jennifer L. Selin. 2012. Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies. Washington
DC: Administrative Conference of the United States.
7Congressional Budget Office. 2012. “A Closer Look at Discretionary Spending.”
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/BS_Discretionary_print.pdf
(May 3, 2014).
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A key tool for presidents to make this transition is the appointment of over 3,000 ex-
ecutives and support staff throughout the executive branch. Yet even as the Washington
Post keeps a running scorecard of the pace of appointments and scholars have detailed the
challenges of presidential transitions and initial appointments, we still know little about how
presidents systematically choose which positions get filled first. This chapter describes how
electoral motivation, together with presidents’ desire for political control of the bureaucracy,
and an emphasis on management teams of both high- and low-level appointees explains why
and how presidents prioritize appointments within agencies. To evaluate the expectations
for which positions presidents prioritize, I use two new sources of data: 1) interviews of
personnel officials in the Obama and Bush administrations and members of the putative
Romney transition team in 2012; and 2) original data on the timing of all 1,926 appoint-
ments made to 6 large agencies in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.
I find that presidents prioritize the secretary’s immediate management team and the offices
for public affairs and congressional relations over more specific policy or functional offices.
These results suggest that, instead of isolating policy preferences from political or electoral
needs, understanding presidential prioritization and selection of personnel requires attention
to both electoral and policy motivations.
Chapter 2: The Dynamics of Appointee Characteristics over Intra-Presidential
Time
A simple notecard from the Reagan transition team, entitled “Criteria in Selecting Ap-
pointees,” listed the key characteristics for evaluating prospective appointees: “1. Com-
mitment to Governor Reagan’s Philosophy, Policies, Objectives; 2. Integrity (background);
3. Competence (demonstrated skill & ability); 4. Team Work (no personal or political
ambition); 5. Toughness (cope with pressure).”8 All presidents want appointees who are
8Thanks to Andrew Rudalevige for generously sharing this and other treasures from his archival research.
This notecard is located in the Annelise Anderson papers at the Hoover Institution (Stanford University),
Accession Number 90032-266267, Box 27, Folder: “Ronald Reagan presidential transition team,
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committed and competent, possess integrity and toughness, and can work in teams; but there
are not limitless pools of potential appointees with high levels of each of these characteristics.
There are constraints on the choices that presidents have in the appointments process, and
these choices can ultimately determine how well presidents and executive agencies perform
at a given time in an administration.
Building on the literatures on appointee characteristics and presidential capacity over
time within an administration, I explain how the perspective and availability of potential
appointees constrain presidents in the appointments process. To evaluate how the back-
ground characteristics of presidential appointees change over the course of an administration
due to these constraints, I analyze a new dataset of over 1,400 resumes of political appointees
during the George W. Bush administration. With these resumes, I measure the changing
capabilities and experience of appointees at all appointment levels and across multiple ex-
ecutive branch agencies from 2001-2008. I find that the level of appointees’ substantive
expertise declines over time, while political experience and education levels remain fairly
constant. These findings highlight how presidential appointment power is limited by the
pools of potential appointees and what the potential consequences might be of declining
appointee and agency capacity over the course of an administration.
Chapter 3: Striped Pants versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of
Career Diplomats and Political Appointees
In his January 2014 confirmation hearing for appointment as ambassador to China, Sena-
tor Max Baucus epitomized the stereotype of a political appointee getting in over his head
when he said, “I’m no real expert on China.”9 Ambassadorial nominees such as Baucus
have long been a flashpoint in the political and scholarly discourse on appointments and
1980-1981: Basic Documents.” See Figure 2.1 for image of notecard.
9Kamen, Al. 2014. “Presumptive ambassador to China Baucus: ‘I’m no real expert on China.’ ”
Washington Post. January 31, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-
loop/wp/2014/01/31/presumptive-ambassador-to-china-baucus-im-no-real-expert-on-china/
(May 3, 2014).
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bureaucratic performance. Although there is a growing and increasingly sophisticated liter-
ature on how appointees might affect performance, the difficulty of defining and measuring
performance has also limited what we know systematically about how federal executives,
whether appointees or careerists, influence bureaucratic performance in different contexts.
This chapter contributes to our understanding of appointees and performance with both
new performance measures and an initial analysis of individual- and organization-level differ-
ences in performance due to the influence of either careerist or appointed leadership. Based
on the historical role of ambassadors in the debate over appointees and performance as well as
methodological advantages to studying this specific class of appointment, I test the personal
and institutional characteristics that affect ambassadorial performance using a new dataset
of embassy inspection reports by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) and State Department biographies. I find that the traditional dichotomy of careerists
versus appointees explains some performance differences in comparable institutional settings,
but that the individual-level characteristics such as language or regional experience that are
expected to affect performance are not influential. The results have important implications
for presidents in their approach to appointee selection, for agencies in how they measure and
evaluate performance, and for our understanding of the influence of leaders, both careerists
and appointees, on agency performance.
Implications and Future Research
If, as Alexander Hamilton argued in 1788, the “true test of a good government is its aptitude
and tendency to produce a good administration” (1788a), the appointment power remains
an important tool for presidents attempting to meet that test. Contributing to the scholarly
literature on presidential priorities, appointee characteristics, and bureaucratic performance,
the preceding chapters highlight some of the incentives and constraints that presidents face
in making appointments and the consequences of their choices. These chapters also raise sig-
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nificant questions for both political leaders and scholars about how the current institutional
environment shapes the choices of appointees and the performance of the agencies that they
lead.
Just as Hamilton outlined the ambition and motivation that could influence presidential
choices in the appointment process, the first chapter describes the role of electoral goals
combined with presidential policy preferences in how presidents set appointment priorities.
Yet by focusing on those positions that get filled, are we ignoring important reasons why
presidents might deliberately delay filling certain positions or leave many vacant for long
periods of time? Scholars have begun to highlight the trends and problems of vacancies
overall while noting the prevalence of vacancies in positions that are primarily operational
or technical, such as inspectors general or assistant secretaries for administration and man-
agement (e.g. O’Connell 2009; Lewis 2011; Dull and Roberts 2009). But are some vacancies
intentional, and if so, who prefers vacancies to filling positions and why? What are the
short- and long-term political and policy consequences of these vacancies? Future research
on priorities could evaluate those positions that are prioritized as well as those that are not.
When positions are filled, whether prioritized early in the administration or not, what
are the substantive qualifications or political experience of the appointees who fill them?
According to Hamilton, presidents, in comparison to a legislative body, would feel “under
stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to
the stations to be filled” (1788b). But, as the second chapter shows, even if presidents want
to select only appointees with the “qualities requisite” to their positions, they are limited
in their choices—especially later in their terms and for lower-level positions that do not
require Senate confirmation—because of varying pools of potential appointees. The result is
that the overall substantive qualifications of appointees decline over intra-presidential time.
Could institutional changes in the presidency and broader executive branch deepen the
pools of potential appointees or help presidents find, recruit, and then retain more qualified
appointees from the existing limited pools?
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And the third chapter on ambassadorial performance buttresses Hamilton’s claim that
“the character of [an] administration” depends on presidents making “judicious choice[s]”
(Hamilton 1788b) in their appointments. Both political appointees and careerists can be
excellent, effective leaders, but presidents and agencies need to be more judicious in how
they select, train, and evaluate them. Combining scholarship on the presidency and executive
branch with research on human capital in economics, sociology, and organizational behavior
could yield important insights into how to select better agency leaders, whether appointed
or career civil servants, in different agency contexts.
Independent strands of the presidency literature address priority appointments, charac-
teristics, and performance; but these surely related topics are commonly treated separately.
We know some positions matter more than others, but are uncertain about what the relevant
differences are and how these differences influence if and when positions get filled, with what
kinds of people, and to what effect. By partitioning the appointment process into discrete
stages, isolating appointments by type and time in term, and focusing primarily on presiden-
tial desire for control, we have glossed over the influence of a president’s electoral goals on
the entire process and how initial appointment decisions dictate subsequent appointments,
the characteristics of appointees, and ultimately appointee and agency performance. The
chapters above provide conceptual and empirical analyses to more closely connect the pre-
viously disparate literatures on appointment priorities, characteristics, and performance as
we seek to further understand presidents and their appointees.
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CHAPTER 1
Help Wanted:
Presidential Priorities
in the Appointments Process
Abstract
With the election of a new president, the leadership of the expansive executive
branch establishment is in flux. Presidents have to identify the priority appointed po-
sitions in each agency to direct agency action toward presidential policy and political
goals; but because of the scale of the executive branch and limited time during the tran-
sition between administrations, presidents cannot easily fill all the positions quickly.
Even with the ritual scoring of how newly-inaugurated presidents fare in matching the
appointment rates of previous administrations and extensive scholarly description of
appointment choices made by new administrations, we still know little about how pres-
idents systematically choose which positions get filled first. This paper outlines how
presidential electoral motivation, combined with a desire for political control of the
bureaucracy to pursue policy goals, and an emphasis on management teams of all ap-
pointee types rather than a dominant focus on individual high-level appointments that
require Senate confirmation explains why and how presidents prioritize appointments
within agencies. I evaluate these claims about which positions presidents prioritize
using two new sources of data. The first source of data is 8 new interviews of per-
sonnel officials in the Obama and Bush administrations and members of the putative
Romney transition team in 2012. The second is new original data on the timing of
all 1,926 appointments made to 6 agencies in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
administrations. Analyzing these data, I find that presidents prioritize the secretary’s
immediate management team and the offices for public affairs and congressional re-
lations. The paper draws out implications of the findings for our understanding of
appointment politics and the presidency more generally.
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3-6; I appreciate Tony Madonna’s excellent discussion and feedback at
the conference. I thank the former White House staffers and Romney Readiness Project contributors for
sharing their insights and experiences with me, and the Graduate School at Vanderbilt for its grant that
made those interviews in March 2014 possible. And I’m also grateful for helpful comments from my
colleagues at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and participants in Vanderbilt’s Graham
Symposium.
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Introduction
In March 2009, just two months into President Barack Obama’s first term, with “the economy
plunging into its deepest recession since the early 1980s,” a New York Times headline blared
that “[Treasury secretary Timothy] Geithner, with Few Aides, Is Scrambling.”11 Though
he had tasked the Treasury department with “rescuing the financial system, the housing
market and the automobile industry,” President Obama had not even nominated a deputy
secretary to work with Geithner, and many of the other top positions in the department were
vacant: “Of the four major federal departments—State, Justice, Defense and the Treasury—
the Treasury has had the fewest nominees even though it is dealing with probably the most
significant problems facing the government.”12 This seeming lack of presidential emphasis on
filling important positions at the Treasury Department while making appointments at other
agencies highlights an important question of why presidents prioritize some positions over
others. In attempting to answer this question, the New York Times ’ scrutiny of President
Obama’s initial appointments in the Treasury Department, like much of the media coverage
and scholarly literature on appointments, focuses on the comparative placement of high-level
Senate-confirmed appointees such as cabinet secretaries and their deputies across agencies
and administrations.
But presidents, with limited time and resources, also have to prioritize appointments
within, and not just across, agencies. Along with the secretaries and deputy secretaries,
presidents have to choose Senate-confirmed appointees to lead individual agencies and bu-
reaus as well as lower level officials to manage agencies’ administrative needs, specific policy
areas or programs, and functions such as public affairs or congressional relations. The jus-
tified journalistic and academic focus on high-level Senate-confirmed positions thus misses
two essential components of why and how presidents prioritize different positions within
11Andrews, Edmund L., and Stephen Labaton. 2009. “Geithner, With Few Aides, Is Scrambling.” New
York Times: B1. March 8, 2009.
12Ibid.
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agencies. The first component is the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974) in the presidential
context, or why presidents might prioritize appointments to agency offices—such as public
affairs or congressional liaison—which contribute as much to credit claiming, position tak-
ing, and inter-branch negotiation as they do to political control of the bureaucracy or policy
implementation.
The second component explains how presidents combine high-profile Senate-confirmed
(PAS) appointments with lower level Senior Executive Service (SES) and Schedule C (SC)
appointments to fill management teams within agencies rather than concentrating just on
each PAS appointment in isolation.13 For example, by the time of the New York Times
article, just 48 days into the Obama administration, President Obama had made more ap-
pointments to Treasury (33) than to either Justice (26) or State (23).14 But of these 33
appointments, just two required Senate confirmation; seven were non-career SES appoint-
ments and 24 were SC appointments. Along with senior advisors to the secretary, these
priority non-PAS appointments included a director and deputy assistant secretary for public
affairs and two deputy assistant secretaries for legislative affairs.15 These initial appoint-
ments to the management team also included what I call “preemptive” appointments: SES
or Schedule C appointments of individuals who are preparing to be or have already been
nominated to a position requiring Senate confirmation.
13Across the executive branch, presidents can appoint approximately 4,000 PAS, SES, or SC appointees,
excluding judicial and advisory committee appointments (Lewis 2011a). PAS appointments account for
roughly 1,000 of the total, while SES (around 700), SC (about 1,600), and other appointments not
requiring Senate-confirmation (typically in the Executive Office of the President) make up the remainder.
Cabinet secretary positions are constitutionally specified as PAS positions, while deputy, under, and
assistant secretaries in many agencies are designated as PAS by statute. For all cabinet agencies and
some independent agencies, inspectors general and general counsel positions are also PAS. SES positions
include chiefs of staff, senior advisors, and many directors or deputy directors at the office level within
agencies. SC positions are often advisors or support staff for functions such as advance and scheduling,
press relations, or congressional liaison.
14Appointment types and start dates come from the Office of Personnel Management.
15Position details for the appointments come from a separate dataset compiled from a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request to the Treasury Department; I used the FOIA data to match specific
positions with the OPM data (which do not include position titles) based on appointment date,
appointment authority, and type. See Data, Measures, and Methods section for further details on OPM
dataset.
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Though there is extensive scholarly description of appointment choices made by new
administrations (Lewis 2008; Mackenzie 1981; Parsneau 2013; Pfiffner 1996; Weko 1995),
as well as the ritual scoring of how newly-inaugurated presidents fare in matching the ap-
pointment rates of previous administrations (Lewis 2011b),16 we still know little about how
presidents systematically choose to fill positions at all appointment levels—rather than just
presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed positions. Presidents rightfully concentrate on
PAS positions, with their legal authority and public and political prominence; but pres-
idents also understand that lower level SES and SC appointees are critical for extending
presidential influence deeper into the bureaucracy as well as providing support to more se-
nior appointees. In this paper, I argue that presidents are motivated by a combination of
electoral goals and the desire for political control to pursue the president’s policy agenda
through both legislative and unilateral action; because of these motivations, presidents pri-
oritize offices that can produce political as well as policy benefits and emphasize teams of
PAS, SES, and SC appointments rather than individual PAS appointments.
After reviewing the appointments and presidential transition literature below, I outline
how presidents balance policy and electoral goals while making appointments in groups
instead of isolated individuals; I then specify expectations for which positions presidents
prioritize within agencies. To evaluate these expectations, I use two new sources of data.
The first source of data is 8 interviews of former Presidential Personnel Office staffers in
the Obama and Bush administrations and staffers of the putative Romney transition team.
The second is a new dataset on the timing of all 1,926 appointments made to six agencies in
the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Analyzing these data, I find that
presidents prioritize the secretary’s immediate management team and the offices for public
affairs and congressional relations. I conclude by discussing the implications of these results
16See e.g. Kamen, Al. 2010. “Obama didn’t break Bush record for speed of appointments.” Washington
Post. January 20, 2010.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/19/AR2010011904506.html
(March 24, 2014).
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and highlighting further research to extend our understanding of presidential prioritization
of appointments.
1.1 Literature Review
With each new administration, journalists and presidency scholars turn their attention to
presidential appointments. Websites track the pace of appointments, and Washington insid-
ers speculate about who might end up in which position. Scholars have examined presidential
transitions and appointments from historical and quantitative perspectives, evaluating how
presidents have gained and use institutional leverage in the modern appointments process
to direct executive branch efforts toward achieving their policy goals—especially through
unilateral actions such as executive orders and rulemaking. I review this literature below
and highlight three critical areas about which we know relatively little: how a president’s
electoral motivation and need for inter-branch cooperation—and not just a desire for polit-
ical control and unilateral action—factor into presidential prioritization of positions in the
broader executive branch; how presidents recognize the importance of and prioritize SES and
SC as well as more prominent PAS appointments; and how presidents make appointments,
especially to PAS positions, in teams rather than in isolation.
Political Control of the Bureaucracy and Priority Appointments in the Modern
Presidency
Until the mid-twentieth century, presidential motivation—whether primarily electoral or
policy-oriented—did not matter much for appointments, particularly at the lower levels in
Washington and the many positions outside of Washington. The national party committees
and state and local party organizations dominated both the nomination of presidential can-
didates themselves and then the distribution of federal jobs in the administrations of their
victorious nominees (Lewis 2008; Milkis 1993; Thompson and Brown 1997; Weko 1995).
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Three major institutional transformations, however, shifted the locus of power in appoint-
ments away from parties and into the White House: 1) civil service reform, begun in the late
nineteenth century (Lewis 2008); 2) the creation of the Executive Office of the President and
the growth of institutional capacity in the White House itself (Rudalevige and Lewis 2005;
Weko 1995); and 3) the end of nominee selection by party elites at national conventions
to the direct selection of nominees through primaries and caucuses (Thompson and Brown
1997).
Over the course of the twentieth century, institutional changes weakened party dominance
of appointments by reducing the number of appointed positions, creating systematic min-
imum requirements for jobs, fostering information-gathering capacity in the White House,
and freeing presidents from party control in the electoral arena. The first of these major
developments—civil service reform—began with the Pendleton Act of 1883. This legislation,
whether intentionally or not (Theriault 2003), initiated the slow decline of party influence of
appointments by introducing merit-based exams and creating a route for entry into govern-
ment service separate from the traditional appointment system. Presidents immediately used
the Pendleton Act’s authority both to “blanket in” favored appointees into the merit-based
protections and to resist party demands and remove positions from the traditional party-
controlled patronage system (Johnson and Libecap 2007). With fewer positions subject
to appointment, the parties’ extensive networks became less important for filling positions
(Mackenzie 1981; Weko 1995) even as they continued to do much of the appointments leg-
work for presidents and kept an office dedicated to handling appointments near the White
House as late as Eisenhower’s administration (Lewis and Moe 2009).
While civil service reform reduced the number of appointments subject to party control,
presidential efforts to cope with rising public expectations for presidential action (Neustadt
1990) and increases in the size of executive branch agencies and the complexity of their re-
sponsibilities (Heclo 1977; Light 1995) led to the presidential efforts to control the executive
branch agencies. Presidency scholars have made the connection between appointments and
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this desire for control, examining presidential strategies such as centralization and politi-
cization (Moe 1985). Centralization is the use of appointees in the Executive Office of the
President (EOP),17 rather than civil servants in the cabinet departments, to gather infor-
mation and develop policy (Rudalevige and Lewis 2005; Rudalevige 2002). Politicization
is increasing the number and depth of appointees in agencies to spread presidential control
(Lewis 2008).
Although presidents have always held formal constitutional responsibility for high-level
appointments and other congressionally designated positions in the bureaucracy, it was not
until the development of the modern presidential institutions such as the EOP (which in-
cludes the Presidential Personnel Office) that presidents began to be seen as effective rivals
to Congress or the parties in control of appointments and the bureaucracy more broadly.
In its modern form, the appointment power is perhaps a president’s most potent tool for
achieving political control of the bureaucracy and unilaterally pursuing policy goals (Moe
1985). And with the informational resources available from centralization, presidents can
now politicize agencies by finding, vetting, and selecting personnel who share specifically
presidential—rather than party—policy or electoral goals (Lewis and Moe 2009). The insti-
tutional capacity for this recruiting, screening, and placing appointees has increased as the
Presidential Personnel Office in the White House has expanded and become more corporate
(Lewis 2012; Patterson and Pfiffner 2001; Weko 1995).
Combined with the compressed transition schedule created by the ratification of the 20th
Amendment in 1933, these institutional changes mean that presidents have to move faster
and exert more effort in making appointments.18 Presidency scholars have taken several
17The EOP itself emerged from Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to control the rapidly growing executive branch
agencies of the New Deal. He appointed three professors of political science and public administration to
lead the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (also known as the Brownlow Committee
after one of the three professors) (Dickinson 1997); the Committee’s conclusion—that “the president
needs help” in managing the expanding executive establishment—was the impetus behind the
Reorganization Act of 1939 and the subsequent creation of the EOP (Dickinson 1997). Prior to the EOP,
presidents had minimal staff resources, either in terms of formal organization or budgetary
appropriations from Congress.
18The 20th Amendment specified that presidents would enter office on January 20th following an election
15
approaches in their study of presidential transitions generally and early-term appointments
specifically. Focusing on the problems of selecting the transition team and then managing the
personnel staffers in the transition period and then in the PPO after inauguration, scholars
have sought to provide new administrations with a better template for the organization of
their transition teams and processes (e.g. Burke 2000, 2001; Kumar and Sullivan 2003;
Kumar 2008; Pfiffner 1996). For example, one lesson learned relating to the prioritization of
appointments came from the Clinton transition in 1992: by placing greater priority on picking
cabinet secretaries rather than solidifying White House staff and processes, the president-
elect hindered both the early pursuit of his policy agenda and his subsequent appointments,
too (Burke 2001).
Along with these guides on lessons learned from past transitions, scholars have also
evaluated appointment priorities in light of presidential agendas. Drawing on the variation
in issue areas of importance to different presidents (e.g. Light 1999), this line of research on
prioritization has described how presidents evaluate both positions and potential appointees
for prioritization. At the agency level, presidents might prefer filling positions first in the
White House Office and Executive Office of the President compared to cabinet departments
and independent agencies. They might also distinguish among these agencies (Lewis 2009),
with Republican presidents less concerned about positions at the Department of Labor or
Democrats in less of a hurry to fill Commerce Department positions (Lewis 2008b). At the
position level, presidential priorities might vary based on specific issues; for example, Reagan
personnel officials determined the “key 87” positions that could influence Reagan’s economic
policy agenda (Lewis 2008b, 28). Parsneau (2013) also highlights how this prioritization
shapes the characteristics of appointees, showing how presidents choose more “loyalist” and
fewer “expert” appointees in agencies high on the presidential agenda.
in November of the previous year, rather than the prior practice of inauguration taking place on March
4th, four months after the election.
16
Making the Executive Electoral Connection
These literatures on political control of the bureaucracy and prioritization of appointments do
not, however, emphasize the role of electoral and other political motivations in a president’s
decision calculus for appointments. For example, Moe argues that presidential concerns differ
from legislators’ constant worry about the next campaign: ”Presidents are not driven by
reelection . . . . More than anything else, they are fundamentally concerned with governance”
(Moe 1990, 237). Other scholars reinforce this characterization of governance trumping
reelection concerns by highlighting presidential policy preferences and the policy effects of
presidential appointments (e.g. Heclo 1977; Nathan 1975; Wood and Waterman 1994).
More recent work emphasizes the role of ideological preferences in presidential choices to fill
appointed positions (Clinton and Lewis 2008; Clinton et al. 2012; Lewis 2008).
Scholars have made this executive electoral connection in other contexts; as Faughnan
and Hudak (2012) argue, it is a question of how, not if, executives use institutional powers for
electoral gain. Research has demonstrated how the electoral motive factors into presidential
policy decisions such as where and when to distribute funds (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010;
Hudak 2012), what enforcement actions executive branch agencies take (Hudak and Stack
2013), and when and how to appeal to the public (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-
Wrone 2005). Some formal models and empirical work on appointments (e.g. Hollibaugh,
Horton, and Lewis n.d.; Lewis and Waterman 2013) do include patronage considerations as
factors in presidential decisions in the appointments process, but the electoral element of
patronage is primarily discussed as a function of who is appointed rather than how specific
positions and functions could serve electoral or other political purposes (Mackenzie 1981;
Pfiffner 1996; Tolchin and Tolchin 1971, 2011; Weko 1995).
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Spotlight on Senate-confirmed Appointees
Both journalistic and scholarly scrutiny of appointments has predominantly emphasized only
Senate-confirmed appointees. The New York Times article on Obama’s appointments to the
Treasury Department exemplifies how much of the journalistic commentary centers on just
PAS appointees, describing the more than 30 SES or SC staffers, all presidential appointees,
as “a skeleton crew of unofficial senior advisers.”19 Much of the scholarly literature on
appointments—whether on nomination and confirmation (e.g. Binder and Maltzman 2009;
McCarty and Razaghian 1999; Parsneau 2013) or appointee characteristics (Aberbach and
Rockman 2009; Burstein 1977; Krause and O’Connell 2011; Nixon and Bentley 2006)—also
justifiably concentrates on Senate-confirmed appointees because of their importance and
the availability of data on their nominations, confirmations, and characteristics (Lewis and
Waterman 2013).
More recent work has highlighted the importance of lower level appointees as well as the
top layer of Senate-confirmed appointees for politicization and performance (e.g. Gallo and
Lewis 2012; Lewis and Waterman 2013; Lewis 2008b). Yet both strands of the literature—
whether on just PAS appointments or also including lower level positions—still struggle to
explain an important aspect of how presidents make appointments. By assuming that, “in
principle, each appointment is a separate action” (Moe 1985, 152), scholars have not exam-
ined how presidents could make appointments as teams, rather than isolated individuals,
to balance levels of skills and characteristics among appointees to achieve their policy or
political goals (Lewis 2011a).
Broadening Our Approach to Prioritization of Appointments
The predominant focus in the literature on presidential prioritization of appointments has
been on top-level PAS appointees, their role in providing presidents with political control
19Andrews, Edmund L., and Stephen Labaton. 2009. “Geithner, With Few Aides, Is Scrambling.” New
York Times: B1. March 8, 2009.
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of the bureaucracy, and the specific challenges of making PAS appointments and navigating
the confirmation process. Yet in this literature there is not much focus on priority generally,
and, more specifically, the influence of electoral motivation and legislative policy goals on
priority. Additionally, the literature focuses on individuals not teams, and on PAS rather
than SES or SC appointments. I explain below a conceptual framework and new data that
could contribute to our limited understanding of these aspects of presidential prioritization
of appointments.
1.2 Presidential Priorities in Appointed Positions
Presidential candidates and their advisors understand that appointments are a key mecha-
nism for gaining political control of the executive branch and for pursuing electoral goals;
and so they begin planning for appointments long before inauguration day. The Presidential
Transition Act of 1963 first authorized the provision of office space and equipment, salaries
for staff, travel expenses, and postal expenses for newly-elected presidents and vice presi-
dents, with expenditures beginning “the day following the date of the general elections held
to determine the electors of the President and Vice President.” A 2010 amendment to the
Presidential Transition Act allows candidates to use office space and purchase equipment
to begin transition planning even before the general election;20 and the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) must provide each major party presidential nominee, within 15 days
of the nominating conventions, details on all presidentially appointed positions, including
information on current appointees and vacancies (5 U.S.C. 1101). These expense accounts
and briefing books represent the most tangible beginnings of the shift from campaign to
administration and the most basic resources for presidents faced with the challenge of iden-
20Bill Hagerty, who worked on appointments for the transition planning teams of both the John McCain
campaign in 2008 and the Mitt Romney campaign in 2012, said that this legislation made a crucial
difference in how the Romney team could prepare compared to McCain’s. Everyone on the McCain team
was “paranoid” about the planning becoming public because of the perception, Hagerty noted, even if
careful preparation for a transition “was the right thing to do” regardless of which party held or would
enter the White House (personal interview, May 9, 2014).
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tifying priority positions and potential appointees for the more than 1100 positions requiring
Senate confirmation and the more than 2000 other presidentially appointed positions.
The three main types of appointment available to presidents are Senate-confirmed ap-
pointees (PAS), Senior Executive Service positions (SES), and Schedule C (SC) appoint-
ments. The location and titles of all executive branch positions that are eligible for appoint-
ment outside of the traditional civil service hiring process are compiled every presidential
election year by either the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform or the
Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; the positions are then
listed and published in the “Plum Book,” so-called for its cover’s color and officially titled
“United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions.”21 The appointed positions
requiring Senate confirmation (PAS appointments) include both high-level agency leadership
roles—e.g. cabinet secretaries, agency administrators, and other upper level management
positions—as well as part-time advisory commission posts for which appointees might not
even be compensated, such as members of the board of directors of the Corporation for
National and Community Service.
Senior Executive Service positions, filled by a mix of career civil servants and non-career
appointees, are the “the key positions just below the top Presidential appointees,”serving
as the “major link between these appointees and the rest of the Federal work force.”22 SES
personnel direct many offices, advise PAS appointees as chiefs of staff or policy experts,
and encumber substantive technical or managerial positions. Schedule C appointees can be
subject or policy experts, too, but also fill roles traditionally associated with patronage, such
as staff assistants responsible for event planning or scheduling and congressional affairs.
21Another type of appointment, called PA for presidential appointment without Senate confirmation, is
primarily for positions in the Executive Office of the President and is not a focus of this paper. For SES
appointments, there are limits on the percentage of non-career appointees in SES positions by agency (no
more than 25%) and across all agencies in the aggregate (no more than 10% of all SES positions); and
some SES positions are designated each year as “career-reserved”positions that cannot be filled by
non-career appointees. SC appointments are nominally made by agency heads, but presidents and their
Presidential Personnel Offices exercise substantial control over these positions (Lewis 2008).
22From U.S. Congress. House. 2012. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Policy and
Supporting Positions. 112th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 43.
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Presidents are motivated by a number of goals, but arguably chief among them is their
desire to be reelected. This is necessary both for personal and political fulfillment but also
the accomplishment of other goals such as achieving policy change and building a legacy.
Including the electoral perspective along with policy or ideological preferences in an ex-
amination of presidential decision-making provides both theoretical leverage and practical
simplicity. Building on the axiom of self-interest, Downs distinguishes between the formal
purpose of parties—to develop and implement policy—and their informal motivation or pri-
vate ambition as “a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office
in a duly constituted election”(1957, 25). Presidents, just as Downs argues for parties, “treat
policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends, which they can reach only
by being elected”(1957, 28). Presidents and parties often take vague positions to provide
flexibility in electoral contests, giving candidates space for adjusting to the preferences or
whims of voters in order to gain the necessary majority or plurality for victory (Downs 1957).
Mayhew articulates four reasons to emphasize the electoral motive:
First, I think it fits political reality rather well. Second, it puts the spotlight
directly on men rather than on parties and pressure groups . . . . Third, I think
politics is best studied as a struggle among men to gain and maintain power
and the consequences of that struggle. Fourth—and perhaps most important—
the reelection quest establishes an accountability relationship with an electorate,
and any serious thinking about democratic theory has to give a central place to
the question of accountability (1974, 6).
Mayhew’s scholarly perspective echoes how an aide to Lyndon Johnson put it, saying that,
“I don’t think there is any doubt that the principal goal of the president, any president, is
to win enough votes in November of an election year to have a second four-year term . . . .
The reelection caravan is provisioned every day. Anybody who tells you differently tells you
wrong”(quoted in Light 1999, 64).
Instead of isolating policy preferences from political or electoral needs, understanding
presidential selection of personnel requires attention to both electoral and policy motiva-
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tions. Faced with limited prospects of getting their legislative programs through Congress
(Rudalevige 2002), presidents are acutely aware of the potential of working through the bu-
reaucracy to unilaterally set policy (Moe and Howell 1999). As President Obama, frustrated
by congressional inaction on his policy priorities, told a group of students in October 2011,
“we can’t wait for Congress to do its job. So where they won’t act, I will. We’re going to look
every single day to figure out what we can do without Congress.”23 Presidents know that
appointees can influence or set policy in many ways, including establishing agency priorities,
directing rulemaking processes, manipulating procurement decisions and grant distributions,
and determining enforcement agendas (e.g. Gordon 2011; Hudak and Stack 2013; Hudak
2012; O’Connell 2008; Wood and Waterman 1991).
Just as presidents pursue political control of the bureaucracy to achieve broad policy out-
comes, the pressure of producing policy and patronage benefits for important constituencies
in a limited time is also a key factor in their decision making; and PPO as an organization is
“far less an instrument of ‘policy control’ . . . and far more a ‘political organization’ ”(Weko
1995, 155). With the election night celebrations still fresh in mind, presidents-elect are al-
ready looking ahead to the next election in four years as they determine their appointment
strategies. Both reelection and policy goals dictate their decision calculus as they think
about how to reward supporters and their potential reelection constituency (Fenno 1978)
with policy outcomes, patronage appointments, and general performance—all in less than
four years. Reelection, according to a staffer in President Obama’s Presidential Personnel
Office (PPO), was a major concern when making appointments, as PPO had to “protect the
brand of the president”ahead of the next election by bringing good people in while simulta-
neously keeping those turned down for jobs “happy enough to still vote for the president at
reelection time.”24
Just making isolated appointments to top-level PAS positions is insufficient; these exec-
23Office of Personnel Management description of SES,
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/ (April 15, 2014).
24Personal interview with Linda Jamison, formerly special assistant in PPO, March 5, 2014.
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utives need support teams that can provide political and policy guidance, plan and execute
internal meetings and external travel and events, handle relationships with key congressional
allies, monitor the implementation of the principals’ directions within the agency, and spread
the word about agency accomplishments to important constituency groups and the general
public. These needs mean that presidents do not look at appointed positions in isolation,
whether across appointment types or agencies (Lewis 2011a). Bill Hagerty, appointment
director for Mitt Romney’s transition planning team in 2012, outlined his view of poten-
tial cabinet members and other appointees as part of “logical groupings,” noting that he
was “loath to present to Mitt a series of one-off picks” and avoided searching for the lone
“rock-star” appointee.25 Instead of appointments as individuals, presidents appoint a mix
of highly visible PAS and “invisible” SES and SC appointees (Lewis and Waterman 2013)
to form teams that maximize a combination of policy performance, patronage needs, and
political benefits. Unlike positions that are designated by statute (primarily PAS), the rules
for SES positions and Schedule C appointments give presidents the flexibility to make initial
appointments quickly and then shift people to where they are needed or most useful (Lewis
2008). And even with increased presidential capacity to search for appointees, presidents
can also delegate much of this initial search for lower level appointees to the principal PAS
appointees.26
In the absence of the limits imposed by the scale of the task and a fixed quantity of
time, presidents could investigate how each appointed position could best contribute to
achieving their electoral and policy goals, and then conduct a thorough search for the most
qualified and willing person to fill each position. But there are too many appointments in
the sprawling executive establishment, too many external forces competing for influence over
25Personal interview, May 9, 2014.
26The willingness of PPO to delegate the selection of lower level appointees to PAS principals seems to
vary by president. One former PPO staffer who served in the Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Bush
administrations described a strong need for PPO control, as they would tell PAS appointees, “we want to
make these selections with you, not for you.” In the Obama PPO, by contrast, staffers described it as
much more of a “negotiation”and that PPO “held an absolute veto”on any choices of the cabinet
secretaries—but rarely, if ever, used it. Personal interviews, March 2014.
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appointments and policy outcomes generally, and too little time for presidents to examine
appointed positions and match their ideal candidates to them—for all positions at the same
time. If presidents are motivated by electoral goals and inter-branch coalitions as much
as by policy preferences, their prioritization of positions should reflect this combination of
motivations rather than just their policy preferences.
So which of the varied positions by function or type are more valuable to presidents for
political or electoral, rather than policy, purposes? The primary factor that influences how
presidents, regardless of motivation, value a specific position is the legal or policymaking
authority of a position. This makes the priority for appointing cabinet secretaries clear; but
what about positions such as assistant secretaries for policy, management or administration,
public affairs, congressional affairs, or other specialized bureaus or offices? Two key sec-
ondary factors for an electorally motivated president could include the position’s visibility
to key political actors or the general public, and its role in coordinating information or ac-
tion across agencies or branches of government. The visibility of a position or its influence
over messages transmitted to the general public, the media, other agencies or branches of
government, and interest groups allows presidents to project their influence. Highly visible
positions command media attention both at the time of nomination and throughout an ad-
ministration; they can help presidents convey their agendas and perspectives to audiences
in Washington, throughout the country, and across the globe. Such visibility enables presi-
dents to undertake the activities Mayhew (1974) associated with electorally-driven members
of Congress: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking.
While scholars have focused on the visibility of presidential acts of “going public”to shape
public opinion in support of policy change (Canes-Wrone 2005; Kernell 2007), presidential
communication strategies—and the appointees charged with carrying out those strategies—
are just as critical for reelection. Presidents expend effort and resources to “create the
appearance of success”as they look toward reelection (Lowi 1985, 11), using the White House
press office and the public affairs offices in agencies–all guided by appointees. These offices
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are an extension of White House communications efforts and serve as platforms for electoral
as well as policy messaging, presenting the president as electorally attractive to the general
public, more narrowly targeted constituency groups, or key elite audiences. Don Gips, the
first PPO director in the Obama administration, highlighted that appointed positions in the
executive branch agencies dealing with the media were priorities for PPO’s early efforts.27
Echoing Neustadt (1990), Kumar argues that because “presidential persuasion is so central
to presidential accomplishments,”a president who does not integrate communications into
all aspects of governance “risks failure of his political, electoral, and policy goals”(2010, xv).
Presidents also want to coordinate the collection and dissemination of information across
agency boundaries; and they want policy development and implementation to reflect their
broader priorities rather than narrow agency preferences. Because of this need for informa-
tion and coordination, presidents have focused on liaison positions in the White House Office
and in cabinet departments. Modeled after the Department of the Army’s legislative liaison
unit with which he was familiar, President Eisenhower created the Legislative Liaison Unit
(now called the Office of Legislative Affairs) in 1953 to manage the White House’s relation-
ship with Congress (Collier 1997); and by the early 1960s, each cabinet agency also had a
dedicated congressional liaison office (Pipe 1966). Appointees in these positions can filter
and shape the policies or information transmitted by agencies to the White House, Congress,
or other agencies by inserting the preferences of specific policy-demanding interest groups or
of key electoral constituencies. In setting priorities, Gips described legislative affairs offices
as a “constant [priority] across all agencies,” noting that “we tried to get those done quickly
for everyone because we had to deal with Congress starting from day 1.”28 Thus even as
presidents pursue unilateral action through the bureaucracy, they still value relationships
with co-partisans in Congress for political and legislative goals. The combination of a po-
sition’s visibility or informational capacity and the electoral connection lead to the main
27Personal interview, March 5, 2014.
28Personal interview, March 5, 2014.
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hypothesis about presidential prioritization:
H1: Presidents will make appointments to public affairs and congressional relations offices
earlier than appointments to policy-oriented offices.
Along with these electorally motivated appointments, presidents appoint lower level ap-
pointees to help cabinet secretaries begin to implement their agendas. Typically the first
appointments made to an agency, cabinet secretaries and agency administrators then get pri-
ority for the appointment of their own immediate staffs. This focus on management teams
leads to prioritization of SES and SC appointments in the office of the secretary even before
the assistant secretary positions for policy or management offices are filled. With plenty
of campaign or congressional staffers with experience in handling campaign events, media
relations, and political outreach, there is a readily available supply of potential appointees
to fill positions on a secretary’s team. And because these “invisible appointments” do not
require senatorial confirmation or receive the same media scrutiny of PAS appointments,
they can be made quickly:
H2: Presidents will appoint SES and SC appointees in the office of the secretary before
making PAS or other appointments in policy-oriented offices.
Within these management teams, presidents use SES and SC appointment authority to
get key people into agencies even if these same appointees are destined for PAS appointments.
Such ”preemptive appointments” are most likely when presidents have already selected spe-
cific individuals with specific skills for high priority issues or tasks; presidents and cabinet
secretaries want these individuals on board and operating within an agency even if they have
to wait for the more formal mantle of a PAS position. By using an alternate appointment
authority that is more flexible, presidents preempt the delay of the confirmation process.
For example, the New York Times article on Treasury department appointments noted that
Geithner was working with a ”skeleton crew of unofficial senior advisers” and that he had
already hired ”about 50 senior advisers” even as nominations to PAS positions were stalled.29
29Andrews, Edmund L., and Stephen Labaton. 2009. “Geithner, With Few Aides, Is Scrambling.” New
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By solely focusing on appointment type, however, the article underestimates the importance
of the specific people for the president’s agenda compared to the position itself as well as
presidential utilization of the various appointment authorities. Of the three nominees for
assistant secretary (PAS) positions in Treasury announced in March 2009, all three were
already working in the agency as either SES or SC appointees.30
In other cases, the preemptive appointment might not result in eventual confirmation for
the intended nominee. President Obama appointed Elizabeth Warren, slated to head the
newly-created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as a special assistant to the President
and special advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury in September 2010.31 But Warren’s ap-
parently inevitable nomination never happened because of increasing likelihood of Senate
opposition to her confirmation.32 And presidents can also make an SES and SC appoint-
ment to head an important office without ever making the PAS appointment for the formally
designated leadership role, such as the appointment of Carl Fillichio to the lead the Depart-
ment of Labor’s public affairs office.33 Fillichio was appointed as a non-career SES senior
advisor for public affairs early in 2009, and no assistant secretary for public affairs, a PAS
position with formal control of the Office of Public Affairs, was ever nominated. In August
2012, President Obama signed the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining
Act, which eliminated the Senate confirmation requirement for many assistant secretaries
for public affairs, including that position in the Department of Labor. As of April 2014,
York Times: B1. March 8, 2009.
30The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. “President Obama Announces Key Treasury
Appointments.” [Press Release]. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-
announces-key-treasury-appointments
31“President Obama Names Elizabeth Warren Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the
Secretary of the Treasury on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,” September 17, 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/17/president-obama-names-elizabeth-
warren-assistant-president-and-special-a (April 15, 2014).
32Dorning, Mike and Carter Dougherty. “Obama Said to Eliminate Warren as Consumer Bureau
Nominee,” Bloomberg News, July 16, 2011.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-15/obama-eliminates-warren-as-consumer-head.html
(April 15, 2014).
33See Carey, Maeve P. 2012. “Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s Confirmation Process, and Changes
Made in the 112th Congress,” Congressional Research Service, October 9, 2012.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41872.pdf (April 15, 2014).
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Fillichio remains the head of public affairs in his original SES appointment.
1.3 Data, Measures, and Methods
To empirically evaluate how presidents prioritize positions, I analyze a new dataset from the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The dataset includes 1,926 PAS, non-career SES,
and SC appointments made during the first terms of the Bush (from January 20, 2001 until
December 31, 2004) and Obama (from January 20, 2009 to December 31, 2012) administra-
tions in the General Services Administration and the cabinet departments of Agriculture,
Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and Veterans Affairs. The OPM data
for these agencies include subagency codes for appointments in separate offices of interest
such as the office of the secretary, general counsel’s office, office of communications or public
affairs, and congressional or legislative relations offices.34 Along with these subagency codes,
each observation contains the beginning and ending date of an appointment, type of appoint-
ment (PAS, SES, SC, or other appointment not requiring Senate confirmation), pay plan,
and grade.35 While I also have observations for over 16,000 appointments in 110 agencies
from 2001-2012, these data do not, however, include any position titles, and, except for the
six agencies above, do not specify where in the agency hierarchies the positions are located.
Thus for the analyses below, I examine appointments made to the six agencies that provided
enough detail in their personnel data submissions to OPM to determine where appointees
work down to the office level.
From this dataset, I focus on two specific subsets. The first subset contains all ap-
pointments made to the six agencies in the first year of each respective administration (see
Table 1.1 below), based on the assumption that presidents get their initial teams in place
by the start of their second year in office. I examine first year appointments specifically
for substantive and methodological reasons. Because many policy changes take time for a
34There is not, however, a subagency code for the congressional affairs office in the Department of
Agriculture.
35Observations have a unique identifier for each appointment, but do not include position titles.
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new administration to implement, “early personnel selections are seized upon as significant
indicators of the priorities and intentions of a new President” (Mackenzie 1981, 5). The
attention to appointments in general wanes after the first year, as high profile appointments
dwindle and media and scholarly websites tracking appointments get less frequent (if any)
updates.36 Thus for an analysis of prioritization, data on appointments from the first year
of each administration—especially for SES and SC appointments—are the most reliable be-
cause promotions, conversion from one type of appointment to another, and turnover begin
to muddle the picture.
This focus on the first year, however, is limited in three important ways: 1) The entire
team might not be complete by the end of the first year, and thus any analysis of priority
based on the first year suffers from a selection problem of not including positions not filled
in that time frame; 2) SES positions can change from excepted or non-career to career-
reserved status, meaning only career civil servants can fill those positions;37 and, similarly,
3) Schedule C positions do not exist until an agency requests approval for a specific position
from OPM. These last two factors hamper analysis because there is not a consistent set of
SES or Schedule C positions across years or administrations to evaluate time to fill. Thus
I analyze a second subset of the data that includes the 142 PAS appointments to the six
agencies during the entire first terms of the Bush and Obama administration. Because
these positions are established by statute and require Senate confirmation, I can account for
positions that were either never filled during the first term or had multiple appointees in
the position as the initial appointees left. And even though the OPM data do not include
position titles, there are multiple data sources such as the Congressional Record and agency
histories that allow me to match the individual observations in the OPM data with specific
PAS positions.
36For example, see the Washington Post ’s Head Count and WhoRunsGov blogs; the Head Count page no
longer exists and the WhoRunsGov blog has not been extensively updated since 2011.
37As Don Gips, the first director of the PPO in Obama’s administration, noted in our interview, PPO has
an extremely difficult task of determining how many non-career SES positions are allocated to each
agency, as cabinet secretaries and other stakeholders vie for these valuable slots to bring in key advisors.
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Table 1.1: First Year Appointments by Type, Agency, & Appointing President
Agency PAS SES SC Total
Agriculture
Bush 13 15 108 136
Obama 10 41 148 199
Total 23 56 256 335
Education
Bush 11 12 61 84
Obama 12 16 94 122
Total 23 28 155 206
General Services Administration
Bush 2 17 7 26
Obama 0 5 18 23
Total 2 22 25 49
Housing and Urban Development
Bush 12 15 55 82
Obama 9 9 34 52
Total 21 24 89 134
Labor
Bush 9 20 81 110
Obama 10 22 59 91
Total 19 42 140 201
Veterans Affairs
Bush 10 7 9 26
Obama 7 11 8 26
Total 17 18 17 52
Total 105 190 682 977
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As a measure of presidential priority, I calculate the number of days from inauguration
to the appointment start date for each appointment. The two features of interest are the
position’s location or function. In these data, I use office type as a proxy for location and
function: office of the secretary, public affairs office, congressional relations office, general
counsel’s office, and all other offices.
I use survival analysis to estimate the effects of office and appointment type on time to
appointment. With Kaplan-Meier survival functions, I evaluate the change in probability of
appointment with the passage of time. I then estimate Cox proportional hazard regression
models to more precisely examine the influence of office type, appointment type, agency-level
effects, and appointing president on the time to appointment. Because each appointment is
not necessarily independent, I use robust standard errors to adjust for the violation of the
assumption of independence.
1.4 Results
To test the first hypothesis about the prioritization of placement of appointees into public
affairs and congressional relations offices before more policy-oriented offices, I first estimate
a Kaplan-Meier survival model for all appointments in the full first terms. As Figure 1.1
highlights, the secretary’s offices are filled quickly and the public affairs and congressional
relations offices get early attention, too. The differences in probability of survival, i.e. an
appointment having not yet been made at a given time, between an appointment in the
secretary’s office, the public affairs or congressional relations offices, and all other offices are
significant at the 0.05 level until over 200 days into the term. As time increases above 300
days into the term and the initial surge of appointments slows, however, the probability of
appointment in offices other than that of the secretary or the public or legislative affairs
offices increases.
To provide greater precision on the relative speed of appointments, I first estimate Cox
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Figure 1.1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by Office Type
proportional hazard regression models for all appointment types in the first year (see Table
1.2 below). These estimates, separated into the first 100 days of an administration and then
the full year, reinforce the primacy of the offices of the secretary and the highly visible public
affairs and congressional relations offices in an administration’s appointment prioritization
while also highlighting the differential pace of PAS appointments compared to SES and SC
appointments. The baseline category for office type is all offices other than the immediate
office of the secretary, the public and congressional affairs offices, and the general counsel’s
office. For appointment type, the baseline category is PAS appointments; and for agency
fixed effects, the baseline agency is the Department of Agriculture. Given an appointment
in the first 365 days of an administration, an appointment to the secretary’s office in the
basic model has a 61% higher hazard rate or chance of getting filled at a given time than an
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appointment to any other office; for public affairs or congressional relations, appointments
have a 59% higher rate of occurring at a given time in the first year than appointments to
other offices.
The estimates for the proportional hazard ratios for SES and SC appointments are higher
than PAS in the first 100 days, likely due to both the nomination/confirmation process itself
for PAS appointees and the greater supply of potential appointees at lower levels. The lower
proportional hazard ratios for SES and SC over the full year, however, could stem from
the delayed appointment of many of these personnel who only enter agencies after the PAS
assistant secretary of a given office is confirmed. Bob Nash, director of presidential personnel
during President Clinton’s second term, described this process: “you really wouldn’t start
working hard on Schedule C’s and SES’s outside the secretary’s office until the sub-cabinet
member was confirmed . . . . [Y]ou wouldn’t want to fill [the office] up with SES’s and Schedule
C’s and have an assistant secretary [then] walk in” (Nash 2000).38
I further distinguish between office types in a Cox model (columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.2),
adding a variable for positions in the general counsel’s office and separating positions in public
affairs from those in congressional relations offices. I include the general counsel’s office as a
measure of how PPO might prioritize positions for political control compared to electoral or
political benefit. Katja Bullock, a key staffer for Republican personnel operations going back
to Reagan’s first term, highlighted positions in the general counsel’s office as high priorities
for political control and unilateral action; these offices were key “watchmen” at the start of
a new administration as they looked for pending regulations or other agency actions that
conflicted with the new president’s agenda.39 But, as the estimates suggest, public affairs
offices are prioritized even more. The lower hazard ratios for congressional relations offices
are surprising given the expectations from both the presidential demand for early legislative
38Interviews with former PPO staffers in the Reagan, H.W. Bush, W. Bush, and Obama administrations
suggest that this deference to PAS appointees on both timing and selection of lower level appointees
could be greater in Democratic administrations than Republican ones.
39Personal interview, March 4, 2014.
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Table 1.2: First Year Appointments by Office and Appointment Type
100 days (1) 365 days (1) 100 days (2) 365 days (2)
Office Type
Secretary’s Office 2.61* 1.68* 2.67* 1.71*
(0.41) (0.15) (0.43) (0.15)
Public & Congressional Affairs 1.13 1.59*
(0.21) (0.14)
Congressional Relations 0.97 1.42*
(0.23) (0.15)
Public Affairs 1.32 1.95*
(0.29) (0.23)
General Counsel 1.49 1.64*
(0.42) (0.33)
Appointment Type
SES 2.54* 0.61* 2.55* 0.59*
(0.81) (0.08) (0.81) (0.08)
SC 2.51* 0.77* 2.56* 0.77*
(0.60) (0.08) (0.61) (0.08)
Agency
Education 1.37 0.67* 1.36 0.66*
(0.29) (0.06) (0.29) (0.06)
GSA 0.80 0.59* 0.80 0.59*
(0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08)
HUD 2.98* 0.84 3.07* 0.82*
(0.54) (0.10) (0.58) (0.09)
Labor 0.94 0.66* 0.96 0.66*
(0.21) (0.06) (0.22) (0.07)
VA 2.36* 0.75* 2.27* 0.73*
(0.70) (0.12) (0.67) (0.12)
President
Obama 0.72* 1.27* 0.72* 1.24*
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
N 243 977 243 977
Note: The baseline category for office type estimates is all other offices; for appointment
type, the baseline is PAS positions; for agencies, the baseline is the Department of
Agriculture. * indicates significance at 0.05 level. Estimates are proportional hazard ratios
and robust standard errors, in parentheses, from Cox proportional hazard regression models.
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coordination40 and the large available supply of campaign and congressional staffers with
the background characteristics of interest for those positions.
For the subset of PAS appointments across the entire first term (Table 1.3 below), ap-
pointments for secretaries, deputy secretaries, and agency administrators occur much faster
than any other appointments, in line with expectations. The appointments for assistant
secretaries of public affairs and congressional relations are faster than for other offices, but
the difference is not statistically significant (see model 1 in Table 1.3). The estimates in
the second model distinguish between congressional relations and public affairs offices, with
the hazard ratio for assistant secretaries for congressional relations suggesting significant
emphasis on those positions and less emphasis on PAS positions in public affairs offices.41
These results from the Kaplan-Meier survival functions and the Cox hazard models in-
dicate that presidents prioritize positions around the cabinet secretary and highly visible
positions in the public affairs and congressional relations offices. While these relatively
crude distinctions between public affairs or congressional relations and all other offices could
conceal important variation in how presidents might emphasize different policy areas, it
clearly highlights that presidents are not solely focused on policy positions.
This further suggests that labor market factors are likely important in how presidents
make appointments. A common assumption is that presidents always get their preferred
candidate for appointed positions, as if there were an absence of constraints on the pool
of potential appointees (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis n.d.). This assumption, however,
highlights how little we know about the labor market or human capital limitations that
presidents confront when trying to fill positions. Such labor market constraints could in-
clude a limited number of individuals with the required skills or capabilities for a certain
40Both Gips, speaking about the Obama administration, and Bullock, from the Republican perspective,
articulated the importance of an early emphasis on legislative affairs positions.
41The estimates for public affairs positions in this model are heavily influenced by the low number of
appointments (7 total PAS appointments) and a vacancy throughout President Obama’s first term in the
assistant secretary for public affairs slot (until the position’s requirement for Senate confirmation was
removed by legislation). In this case, Obama made a non-career SES appointment to head the office
rather than nominate someone for the PAS assistance secretary position.
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Table 1.3: First Term PAS Appointments by Office Type
Model 1 Model 2
Office Type
Secretary’s Office 6.94* 7.53*
(2.09) (2.27)
Public & Congressional Affairs 1.26
(0.36)
Congressional Relations 3.13*
(0.74)
Public Affairs 0.80
(0.30)
General Counsel 1.00
(0.45)
Agency
Education 0.57* 0.54*
(0.16) (0.15)
GSA 0.15* 0.14*
(0.08) (0.07)
HUD 0.44* 0.45*
(0.13) (0.13)
Labor 0.54* 0.55*
(0.14) (0.14)
VA 0.59 0.58
(0.18) (0.18)
President
Obama 0.75 0.77
(0.13) (0.13)
N 142 142
Note: The baseline category for office type is all
other offices; for agencies, the baseline is the
Department of Agriculture. * indicates significance
at 0.05 level; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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appointed position, a lack of information or interest on the part of qualified individuals, or
large disparities in prestige or compensation between similar positions in the private sector
compared to the appointed position. These limited labor markets could make certain posi-
tions, such as more technical or specialized policy positions, more difficult to fill compared
to spokesperson, speechwriting, or congressional liaison positionsregardless of how great a
priority PPO might place on filling them quickly.
For the placement of management teams composed of lower level or “invisible” SES and
SC appointments, Kaplan-Meier survival estimates indicate that SES and SC appointments
in the secretary’s office (238, 76.5%) are made significantly before PAS appointees (73, 23.5%)
in other offices (Figure 1.2 below).
Figure 1.2: Survival Estimates for Visible/Invisible Appointments
One element of this discrepancy is likely due to greater scrutiny both from the White
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House in the pre-nomination internal vetting and from the media and Senate in the formal
confirmation process for PAS appointees. Another possible factor is that the cabinet secre-
taries have their own trusted staff and advisors ready for appointment, reducing the time and
effort required from the Presidential Personnel Office to find and vet potential appointees.
Just as presidents have key campaign advisors who transition immediately to presidentially
appointed staff in the White House Office or Executive Office of the President, cabinet sec-
retaries have their own retinue ready to make a similar transition into agency management
positions.42 These management teams also include the preemptive appointments of indi-
viduals who can begin exerting influence on agency actions even without completion of the
formal process for PAS positions.
1.5 Conclusion
Though most press accounts about appointments emphasize the highly charged nomination
and confirmation process for PAS positions, presidents invest time and political capital, both
before and after election day, to put their teams in place in executive branch agencies by
using all available appointment types. The results above contradict the typical narrative of
presidential neglect of important PAS positions and highlight that presidential priorities at
the beginning of an administration are not limited to high-level policy positions; instead,
presidents and their personnel operations focus on the cabinet secretary’s management team,
including preemptive appointments for key policy roles, and positions that contribute to
advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. As scholars have long argued, presidents
want political control of the executive branch agencies to enable them to undertake unilateral
actions; but this is not the only factor in their appointment choices. Making the executive
electoral connection between appointments and reelection concerns contributes to a broader
42Additional survival estimates (Appendix A) on appointments made by Bush and Obama in their first
years of office suggest some possible differences in approach; see also note 38 above on how this could be
a function of greater latitude extended by Democratic presidents to their cabinet and subcabinet PAS
appointees on selection of SES and SC personnel.
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understanding of how presidents seek both political and policy benefits under challenging
time and institutional constraints.
By looking at appointments in groups, we also gain insight into what the possible limits
are to presidential control over appointments. Much of the descriptive literature on ap-
pointments has documented increasing White House control of appointments, but how much
influence do presidents still cede to cabinet secretaries on the composition of their manage-
ment teams and the other appointees in their agencies? For effective control of an agency,
secretaries and administrators need their management teams to be in sync with their goals,
styles, and perspectives. Because of this, these high-level PAS appointees still have a role
in choosing specific appointees, and presidential personnel staff outsource some of the work
involved in finding potential appointees to these PAS appointees. Just as Mayhew (1974)
describes voters choosing between not just executives but also their retinues of advisors as
well, presidents, by selecting specific PAS appointees, are also choosing the advisors and
confidants of those appointees.
The appointment dynamics described above could also shift as a result of two recent
developments. The first is the passage of the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and
Streamlining Act (PAESA) in 2012; this act removed more than 160 positions from Senate
confirmation and created expedited confirmation procedures for another group of appointed
positions. The second is the so-called “nuclear option,” a rule change in the Senate that al-
lows for a simple majority vote, rather than supermajority to invoke cloture and end debate,
on most nominations. Though the premise of PAESA was to lower the Senate’s workload
and, at least nominally, improve presidential ability to get key appointments into place, the
positions from which the confirmation requirement was removed are not likely to change in
their relative priority for presidents. And combined with the nuclear option, the streamlin-
ing could in fact exacerbate the problems of Senate-confirmed positions as senators might
work harder to leverage their control over the remaining appointments that require confir-
mation in their inter-branch squabbles with the president. Senators will continue to bottle
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up appointments in committee, delay or extend vetting, and pursue their own interests in
the battle for final confirmation. These reforms are unlikely to speed up nominations or
make other PAS appointments easier for presidents; and they will not limit the incentives
for “preemptive” appointments at the SES and SC levels. The appeal of appointing policy
“czars” and other advisors to increase capacity within the White House and the Executive
Office of the President (Rudalevige 2002) might also grow.
The findings above also lead to other important questions relating to both the reasons for
and the consequences of prioritization: First, how does this prioritization of appointments
influence what does or does not get accomplished early in an administration? Does the
pool of potential appointees constrain presidential prioritization or influence which positions
remain vacant for long periods of time? And are there differences in approach across pres-
idents as individuals or by party that affect the pace and prioritization of appointments?
As several former Presidential Personnel staffers noted in interviews, the Bush and Obama
administrations differed in several important respects: the level of attention given to per-
sonnel by the presidents themselves, the nature of the relationship between the director of
presidential personnel with the president and other key White House staffers, and distinct
approaches to the relationship with executive branch agencies as friends or foes. These dif-
ferences affected the planning processes for transition and early-term appointments, the rate
of turnover among Presidential Personnel Office staff, and the administrations’ attitudes of
either reluctance toward or acceptance of agency officials filling vacant appointed positions
in acting capacities.
Further exploration of these questions is critical to understanding presidential prioriti-
zation of appointments. Though often seen as simply fodder for inside-Washington gossip
games, these decisions can have enormous national and international consequences. Whether
a presidential transition occurs during a period of economic turmoil, war, natural disaster, or
other crisis, presidential appointment decisions dictate how executive branch agencies work
toward solutions, how Congress and the president interact, and how the public learns about
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and responds to such challenges. By looking at presidential electoral motives in conjunc-
tion with policy goals, lower-level SES and Schedule C appointees as well as the more visible
Senate-confirmed appointees, and the appointment of teams rather than individuals, journal-
ists and scholars alike can better illuminate the appointments process as one administration
gives way to the next.
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CHAPTER 2
The Dynamics of Appointee Characteristics over
Intra-Presidential Time
Abstract
Whether in press accounts of an exhausted administration or discussions of a “lame
duck” president, there is a common narrative of declining presidential influence over
the course of an administration. Scholars have also found systematic evidence of the
ebbs and flows of presidential capacity for policy making in “honeymoon” and “Cin-
derella” phases of a presidency. To explain one possible factor in this perceived decline
of presidential influence over “intra-presidential” time, I first outline how the perspec-
tive and availability of potential appointees constrain presidents in the appointments
process. I then evaluate how the background characteristics of presidential appointees
change over the course of an administration due to these constraints. Drawing on a
new dataset of appointee characteristics collected from over 1,400 resumes of political
appointees during the George W. Bush administration, I measure the changing ca-
pabilities and experience of appointees at all appointment levels and across multiple
executive branch agencies. I find that levels of appointees’ substantive expertise de-
cline over time, while political experience and education remain fairly constant. The
paper draws out the implications of these findings for our understanding of how labor
markets for appointees constrain presidential choices and could affect presidential and
agency performance.
I thank the former White House staffers and Romney Readiness Project contributors for sharing their
insights and experiences with me, and the Graduate School at Vanderbilt for its grant that made those
March 2014 interviews possible. I also express gratitude to my colleagues at the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions for their data collection and coding efforts in the appointee resume project.
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Introduction
The oft-repeated title—“The Incredible Shrinking President”—of a Time magazine cover
story on George H.W. Bush,44 Bill Clinton’s plaintive press conference asserting his contin-
ued relevance after the 1994 mid-term elections,45 and recent articles about Barack Obama’s
lame duck presidency46 are just a few of the many examples that bolster the narrative of
declining presidential influence on the content or implementation of public policy over the
course of an administration. This decline includes diminishing public support and rising
congressional resistance after an initial “honeymoon” phase of legislative productivity and
cooperation. Yet a conflicting narrative simultaneously highlights a seemingly inexorable in-
crease in presidents’ institutional strength as they act unilaterally to overcome congressional
opposition or gridlock. In a series of speeches leading up to and including the 2014 State of
the Union address to Congress, President Obama repeatedly articulated both his willingness
and capacity to pursue policy goals without waiting for congressional action.47 The multiple
delays and waivers for elements of the Affordable Care Act provide recent examples of such
unilateral executive action.48
These apparently contradictory narratives illustrate two important and interconnected
factors that constrain or enhance presidential policy influence: time and institutional capac-
ity. Each year of a presidential administration is not the same, as the first year gives way to
44Duffy, Michael. 1992. “The Incredible Shrinking President.” Time. June 29, 1992.
45The American Presidency Project. “The President’s News Conference,” April 18, 1995.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51237 (February 8, 2014).
46See e.g. Milbank, Dana. 2014. “America Doesn’t Need a Lame Duck President.” Washington Post.
Janaury 30, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-america-doesnt-
need-a-lame-duck-president/2014/01/30/110c90ac-8a04-11e3-916e-e01534b1e132_story.html
(February 10, 2014).
47For one such speech a few weeks before the State of the Union address, see Dann, Carrie. 2014. “Obama
on exec action: ‘I’ve got a pen, and I’ve got a phone.’ ” NBC News. January 14, 2014.
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/14/22302586-obama-on-exec-action-ive-got-a-
pen-and-ive-got-a-phone?lite (February 10, 2014).
48“The Obama administration has a mandate on the health-care law, too.” Washington Post. February 11,
2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-administration-has-a-mandate-on-
the-health-care-law-too/2014/02/11/f001df36-9361-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html
(February 13, 2014).
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the mid-term election; the end of the first term is consumed by a reelection campaign; and
then another mid-term election year precedes the final phase of an administration. The dif-
fering policy and political contexts across “intra-presidential time” (Lewis and Strine 1996)
demand unique presidential actions, even as external events and other political forces also
shape the political landscape.
To meet these distinct phases and challenges, the institutional capacity of the modern
presidency has adapted in formal and informal ways. From the establishment of new agen-
cies and organizations, such as the Executive Office of the President or the Department
of Homeland Security, to the increasing output of executive orders and agency regulations,
presidents have more organizational capacity and scope for action. They also have informal
means to wield influence, whether through relationships with the media or innovative forms
of public outreach.
Scholars have studied time and institutional capacity both across and within presidential
administrations, and there is a growing literature on how these factors interact over the
course of a president’s term in office to influence formal presidential actions—such as agency
regulations, executive orders, and vetoes—and informal relationships with Congress, the
press, and the public. But we know relatively little about how one significant component of
both formal and informal forms of presidential policy influence changes over intra-presidential
time and affects institutional capacity throughout the executive branch: the characteristics
of presidential appointees. These appointees help design and implement presidential policy
choices, such as the Affordable Care Act waivers issued by the Treasury Department;49 and
presidents also make appointments as rewards for campaign work or financial support. Few
of these appointees stay for an entire term or across two terms for a reelected president,
requiring presidents to make new appointments throughout terms.
If these appointees are consistently capable and effective over the course of an adminis-
49Pear, Robert. “Further Delays for Employers in Health Law.” New York Times. February 11, 2014: A1.
Print.
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tration, presidents could counter the perceived decline in influence over congressional action
or in public support. But if a president’s concern for reelection and emphasis on patronage
hinders good governance or the administration’s initial momentum toward achieving policy
goals gives way to executive branch exhaustion and diminished capacity with new appointees
later in a term, the decline in presidential or executive branch performance could be both
real and significant—even as presidents rely on them to carry out increased unilateral action.
The consequences for policy and performance, in areas from education to national security,
could range from simply frustrating and embarrassing50 to devastating.51
In this paper I evaluate how and why the background characteristics of presidential
appointees change over the course of an administration to explain one possible factor in
the decline of presidential capacity over “intra-presidential” time. I draw on a new dataset
of appointee characteristics collected from the resumes of political appointees during the
George W. Bush administration to measure the changing capabilities and experience of
appointees at all appointment levels and across multiple executive branch agencies. I find
that levels of appointees’ substantive expertise—except for education and task experience—
decline over time, while political experience spikes immediately following elections and then
also declines. These findings suggest that the characteristics of appointees are not only a
function of presidential choice, but also depend on the motivations and the size of the market
of potential appointees from which presidents choose appointees. Because of these constraints
on presidential appointment power and any consequent decline in agency performance, a
president’s capacity to dictate policy through unilateral action could diminish over the course
of an administration even as the president’s reliance on such action increases.
50For a recent example of a donor-turned-ambassador who focused on decorating her residence more than
diplomacy, see: Lee, Matthew. “Big Obama donor Cynthia Stroum quits envoy job amid criticism.”
Associated Press. February 4, 2011.
51The most prominent recent example of unqualified appointees performing badly in a critical situation is
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s appointee leadership during the response to Hurricane
Katrina (Lewis 2008b). For another perspective on why even some apparently qualified groups of
appointees fail because of a lack of balance of skills and backgrounds, see David Halberstam’s The Best
and the Brightest (1993).
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2.1 Literature Review
The relationship of both time and appointees to presidential capacity has received significant
attention in the popular press and academic literatures; yet the connection between time and
appointee characteristics—and the consequent challenges for presidential action and influence
across intra-presidential time—remains unexplored. I first define the element of time that
is the focus of this paper and describe the different ways in which scholars have examined
its effect on presidential power. I then review the literature on presidential appointments,
focusing on the research on the characteristics of appointees. While we know a lot about
time and appointees separately and have anecdotal evidence of their interaction, there has
been no systematic study of why or how appointee characteristics might vary over time
within presidential administrations. Connecting these two disparate literatures could then
shed light on how appointee characteristics and agency performance could vary depending
on both presidential choices and underlying labor markets for potential appointees.
Defining Time and Its Effects on the Legislative Agenda, Unilateral Action,
and the Public Presidency
Presidency scholars have examined multiple facets of time in relation to presidential power.
One focus has been on linear or “secular” time (Lewis and Strine 1996), with presiden-
tial power growing, in fits and starts, from Washington’s election in 1789 to the present—
especially in comparison with the power of Congress (Cooper 2009). Presidents have also
been categorized as parts of different “regime” times, corresponding with the ebb and flow
of parties, issues, and historical events (Skowronek 1993). With Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
presidency designated as the beginning of a new presidential era—though the case could
be made for the inflection point occurring with the presidency of either his distant cousin
Theodore or fellow Democrat Woodrow Wilson—presidents are distinguished as “early” or
“modern” based on their position relative to Roosevelt’s four-term marathon (e.g. Neustadt
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1990).
For the present analysis, I focus on “political” or “intra-presidential” time: “This time
framework focuses on time within a presidency, both in terms of the year within a term and
whether it is a president’s first or second term” (Lewis and Strine 1996). Within political
time, presidents go through “honeymoon” and “Cinderella” periods at the beginning and
end of their terms, with mid-term elections an important turning point. This calendar of
“policy cycles” based on political context means that presidents are most influential just
after winning election or reelection and then spiral downward in a “cycle of decreasing
influence” even as presidents are becoming more effective through increasing expertise (Light
1999). Intra-presidential time is not itself causal, but is rather a proxy for the changing
circumstances inherent to the political world in which presidents operate: rising congressional
opposition, the need to focus on the next election rather than longer-term governance, a
growing number of disappointed supporters frustrated by the gap between campaign rhetoric
and actual policy achievements, and the related and natural decline in approval as public
excitement and attention wane.
Even before the first presidential administration of George Washington, there was exten-
sive consideration of the effects that this concept of time in office would have on presidential
power and influence. As Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers, sufficient du-
ration of presidential terms and the potential for multiple terms were crucial for promoting
“the energy of the Executive authority” (Hamilton 1788a). He worried about how approach-
ing elections might change executive behavior and how the zeal of a new president could
lead to excessive change and a “disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of
the government” (Hamilton 1788b). These concerns are echoed in Lowi’s “law of effort,” in
which presidents “spend the first half of their terms trying sincerely to succeed” and then
“devote the second half of their terms to create the appearance of success” just in time for
reelection (1985, 11).
To empirically evaluate changes in presidential power across this “intra-presidential time,”
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Lewis and Strine (1996) examine presidential vetoes and find little effect. But other theoret-
ical and empirical work on different types of presidential action has highlighted the role of
time on the choices available to presidents in pursuing both political and policy goals. The
legislative sphere is traditionally considered the area in which the possibility for presidential
policy success declines most precipitously due to structural features (Krehbiel 1998); other
theoretical work emphasizes the incentives for presidential effort during the “honeymoon”
period (Beckmann and Godfrey 2007). This emphasis on the beginning of a term is borne
out by empirical analysis demonstrating that failure on items on the president’s legislative
agenda increases as time (measured by months-in-term) passes (Rudalevige 2002).
The legislative agenda is not, however, the only means by which presidents can achieve
their goals; thus failure of that agenda is not necessarily definitive evidence of declining
influence. As Howell and Mayer note, “[b]y ignoring important policy options outside of
the legislative process, scholars have exaggerated the frailty of outgoing presidents and un-
derestimated the influence they continue to wield. Presidential power does not reduce to
bargaining, negotiating, and convincing members of Congress to do things that the presi-
dent cannot accomplish on his own. Presidents can (and regularly do) act alone” through
executive orders, agency guidance and rulemaking, directives, and proclamations (2005, 534).
Scholars have found both beginning and end of term effects on the issuance of executive
orders (Mayer 1999; but see Krause and Cohen 1997). For “midnight” or late-term activity
including executive orders and other regulatory actions, the effects are especially strong when
there is party change in the White House (Howell and Mayer 2005). Agency rulemaking is
another avenue for presidential policymaking that demonstrates strong “Cinderella effects”
of increased rulemaking generally at the end of presidential terms (de Rugy and Davies
2009). O’Connell finds that there is variation across executive branch agencies in both the
promulgation and withdrawal of rules early or late in terms, and even while Congress was
in lame duck sessions after mid-term elections changed party control of Congress (e.g. the
Clinton administration in late 1994) (O’Connell 2008). McLaughlin (2010) suggests that
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two mechanisms for this increased regulatory output are both higher rates of submissions of
economically significant regulations and expedited review by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs.
Along with the presidential legislative agenda and executive branch policy decisions,
researchers have examined changes in the public presidency over intra-presidential time.
Presidents adjust their rhetoric to be more or less congruent with public opinion based on the
proximity of elections, either presidential reelection or mid-terms (Canes-Wrone and Shotts
2004; Rottinghaus 2008). Their relationship with the media also reflects the influence of time
in office. Grossman and Kumar characterize the “phases” of this relationship as alliance,
competition, and detachment: “The phases usually appear in sequence. The period of
alliance coincides with the early months of a new administration. The period of competition
is generally in full swing by the end of the first year. The start of the period of detachment
depends upon the sequence of events that leads both White House officials and reporters to
give up on their efforts to mold the other’s behavior.” (1979, 40)
Presidential Appointees and Their Characteristics
From this research, we know that there are predictable changes in the political context
over a president’s time in office that significantly influence many aspects of the modern
presidency. In the literature on presidential appointments and their characteristics, however,
intra-presidential time is understudied both theoretically and empirically. The normative
and descriptive work on appointments and appointee characteristics is extensive, and recent
research has begun providing greater empirical analysis of appointee characteristics. Changes
in presidential appointments across secular time also feature in this literature, but work on
intra-presidential time and appointees is limited. And the early work on changing appointee
characteristics examines only presidential motivation or choice, ignoring the role of differences
in the availability and motivations of potential appointees.
Scholars have long studied the various characteristics, skills, and experience of presidential
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appointees, including personal connection to the president or other high-level politicians,
issue or functional expertise, ideological alignment, campaign or other work for the party,
ascriptive or demographic characteristics, or interest group affiliation (Burstein 1977; Heclo
1977; Lewis 2008; Mackenzie 1981). At a theoretical level, there is a long-running debate over
the normative standards that should apply to the appointments process. One perspective
on the bureaucracy argues that “neutral competence” (Heclo 1975) is the goal for which
presidents should aim, while other work claims that presidents should and do take into
account loyalty to select appointees for “responsive competence” (Moe 1985).
There is a detailed descriptive literature of the various characteristics or traits that pres-
idents want in appointees that would make appointees more responsive as well as more
competent (Mackenzie 1981; Pfiffner 1996; Weko 1995). Building on this descriptive work,
empirical studies have conceptualized appointee characteristics as located on two distinct
dimensions of varying importance to presidents: loyalty versus competence.52 And just as
presidents seek to evaluate either the loyalty or competence of a potential appointee, they
also look to place patronage appointees as a reward for their support (Hollibaugh, Horton,
and Lewis n.d.; Lewis and Waterman 2013).
Scholars have recently begun seeking explanations and evidence for how presidents match
characteristics with specific positions (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis n.d.; Krause and
O’Connell 2011; Lewis and Waterman 2013; Lewis 2011) or with specific agencies (Parsneau
2013); but especially for positions that are not Senate-confirmed, the lack of data and jour-
nalistic or other scrutiny makes progress difficult (Lewis and Waterman 2013). As Lewis
and Waterman (2013) argue, however, it is precisely these positions where more scrutiny is
needed, as these mid-level appointees are playing an increasingly important role in presiden-
tial strategies for bureaucratic control. Many of these mid- or low-level appointments are
made with the input of higher-level appointees (Weko 1995), who view them as management
teams rather than individual appointments.
52Or “compliance” versus “expertise” in Krause and O’Connell’s formulation (2011).
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The literature addresses changes in appointments across secular time, including trends in
overall appointment numbers and the agencies in which appointees are placed (Lewis 2008),
as well as how presidents have tried to centralize recruitment and control of appointed po-
sitions (Weko 1995). For appointments in intra-presidential time, there are popular press
accounts about first-string versus second-string appointees53 or interest group tracking of ap-
pointee characteristics54 to go with studies on turnover among PAS appointees (O’Connell
2009) and EOP staff (Dickinson and Tenpas 2002). There is also evidence about declining
confirmation rates on Supreme Court nominees and PAS appointees in presidents’ second
terms (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 2009). Krause and O’Connell have begun evaluating
a model of presidential learning in the appointments process with a dataset of PAS ap-
pointee characteristics across multiple administrations (Krause and O’Connell 2013). Yet
even though their approach is the most direct effort yet on appointee characteristics and
intra-presidential time, their primary focus is on how presidents might change their appoint-
ment choices without considering that there could be important constraints on such choices
due to the differences in the pools of appointees available for different positions, especially
below the PAS level.
Connecting Appointee Characteristics and Intra-Presidential Time
While we know a lot about different actions that presidents take over time as well as about
the people who develop and implement presidential actions, there is much to learn about how
the characteristics of these appointees change over an administration. Given the findings in
the literature on how time constrains presidents and the effects of appointee characteristics
on agency performance, connecting these two literatures could illuminate a critical element
of presidential influence and provide a better understanding of what incoming and reelected
53Allen, Mike and Jim Vandehei. “Obama second term: Team of insiders.” Politico.com. September 14,
2012. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81199.html (February 17, 2014).
54See e.g. “President Obama’s Second-Term Ambassadorial Nominations.” American Foreign Service
Association. http://www.afsa.org/secondterm.aspx (February 17, 2014).
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presidents need to take into consideration as they approach the appointments process. Even
if presidents and their personnel operations are becoming more corporate and professional
(Lewis 2011) and subsequently learning and improving over intra-presidential time (Krause
and O’Connell 2011), their appoitment choices might still be limited by the depth of the
labor pool from which they select appointees. By examining the changing characteristics and
capacity of appointee leadership in the executive branch agencies from both the presidential
and potential appointee perspectives, this paper can contribute to our understanding of
variation in presidential capacity over intra-presidential time.
2.2 Why Appointee Characteristics Change
During an Administration
Whether developing and shepherding their legislative agendas through the congressional
gauntlet (Rudalevige 2002), gaining political control of the executive branch establishment
to act unilaterally (Moe and Howell 1999; Moe 1985), or “going public” to shape or pander
to public opinion (Canes-Wrone 2005; Kernell 2007), presidents need help as they attempt
to achieve desired policy and political outcomes—and they hope to get that help from ap-
pointees. If those appointees are more or less capable over intra-presidential time, presidents
could consequently become more or less powerful and effective in achieving their goals. In
this section I outline why appointee characteristics could vary over time as a result of poten-
tial appointees’ motivations and limited pools of potential appointees from which presidents
can reasonably choose; and I lay out expectations for how specific appointee characteristics
vary both over time and by appointment type as a result of these factors.
Presidential versus Appointee Perspectives
Scholars have primarily examined appointee characteristics from a presidential perspective
and have assumed that variation in those characteristics results from presidential preferences
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and choices. Other models of the appointments process focus on institutional veto points
such as the formal White House vetting process or Senate confirmation procedures that
could shape appointee characteristics because of the conflicting goals between presidents and
other political actors with influence over an appointment (e.g. Hollibaugh 2013; McCarty
and Razaghian 1999). But because of this emphasis on the presidential perspective, the
literature has not closely analyzed the preferences or motivations of potential appointees
themselves. Just as presidents recognize and pursue the benefits of the appointment power,
potential appointees have their own reasons for accepting an appointment. Presidents get
zealous campaign workers who hope for a follow-on appointment in the administration (Weko
1995), competent policy experts to staff cabinet agencies, politically experienced operatives
to shape and coordinate the efforts across the administration, and, at the conclusion of an
administration, a cohort of sympathizers with an incentive to protect “their” president’s
legacy. Appointees get status and position, an opportunity to make or influence policy, an
important line on a resume, and connections throughout the party and Washington to use
later in their careers (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis n.d.).
This apparent win-win situation does not mean, however, that presidents always get the
appointees they want. Though much of the appointments literature assumes that presidents
are simply picking from a pool of willing applicants, there are limitations on presidential
exercise of the appointment power that come from the human side of the appointments
process. Theoretical and empirical work on the motivations and types of careerists—which
has colorfully characterized them as “slackers” or “zealots” (Gailmard and Patty 2007), or
as “climbers,” “conservers,” “zealots,” “advocates,” or “statesmen” (Downs 1967)—could
equally apply to appointees. Potential appointees, like careerists, vary in their own ideologi-
cal and policy preferences, expectations for current or potential future earnings, and distinct
career trajectories (Lewis 2009), whether as ambitious and experienced politicians looking
for cabinet-level positions (e.g. Nicholls 1991) or eager college students volunteering for a
campaign. The self-interest axiom that underpins the assumption of presidential, party, and
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congressional electoral motivations (Downs 1957; Mayhew 1974) also applies to potential
appointees. Even if the president and the potential appointee share party affiliation or ide-
ology, their own self-interest often leads to a divergence of goals or of opinions of how to
achieve shared goals. As Cyert and March explain, “people (i.e. individuals) have goals;
collectivities of people do not” (1963, 30).
Based on such self-interest, potential appointees can wield an absolute veto on their
appointment if their own goals or preferences conflict with those of the president. Potential
appointees can refuse an appointment preemptively or at any point in the White House formal
or informal vetting process or during Senate confirmation. The reasons for such refusals are
many, even for potential appointees who have served previous presidents, donated money to
presidential campaigns, or share similar ideological or policy goals:
American presidents face numerous obstacles in retaining the ‘best and brightest’
in the service of their administrations. One important obstacle is the service of
many masters by the political appointee. Members of Congress, interest groups,
and the agency itself may try to influence the appointee in a way that conflicts
with the administration’s goals. Navigating this minefield can make service for
the president quite unattractive. A second obstacle is the appointee’s numerous
outside opportunities in both the private and public sectors that may make their
service on behalf of a president transitory at best (Chang, Lewis, and McCarty
2001).
While some potential appointees might see the opportunity presented by an appointed
position, some see an onerous vetting process, which, for prospective appointees with ex-
tensive business ties or financial holdings, could cost over $200,000 in legal and accounting
fees—without a guarantee of even being appointed.55 Others are deterred by the prospect
of lower compensation, the hassle of relocating to Washington or a regional office for what
could be a short stay, the lack of decision-making authority, or other constraints of the bu-
reaucracy. In one such circumstance just before President Obama’s inauguration in January
2009, Susan Tierney was reported to be President Obama’s nominee for deputy secretary
55Bill Hagerty, appointments director for the Romney Readiness Project in 2012, personal interview, May
9, 2014.
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of energy after having previously served as an appointee in the Clinton administration and
as the leader of Obama’s transition team for the Department of Energy.56 Yet less than six
weeks after the speculation about her imminent nomination, the Washington Post reported
that Tierney, in the midst of the vetting process, chose to withdraw from consideration for
the position.57 Just a few days later, in March 2009, prominent neurosurgeon and television
commentator Sanjay Gupta announced that he was no longer a candidate for appointment
to the position of Surgeon General. Gupta cited a desire to continue his medical practice
and media role and his concern about losing control of his schedule for family reasons.58
Other well-qualified candidates might simply not want to work in Washington or for a
particular president. As Lewis argues, “presidents need loyalty” in the bureaucracy, yet
“many of the people whose expertise, reputation, or political connections make them eligible
for a position will have no particular loyalty to the president” (2011, 55). Some potential
appointees might foresee the damage to their reputations or future career prospects that could
result from loyalty or responsiveness to a president—and balk at paying such a high cost for a
relatively short-term appointment. For example, former colleagues have vigorously criticized
current State Department legal advisor Harold Koh for policy positions he has espoused in
the State Department that contradict much of his scholarly output prior to appointment.
Koh himself noted in an interview that, “the longer I serve in government, I get questions
of the following form: ‘You’re a hypocrite, aren’t you?’ ” (Johnson 2011).
Even as those most capable might not be interested for reasons articulated above, those
most interested—campaign workers, donors, friends and relatives of other politicians—might
56Kamen, Al. “Susan Tierney to Become Energy Dept. Number Two.” Washington Post.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/01/15/susan_tierney_to_become_energy.html (April
18, 2014).
57Shear, Michael D. and Philip Rucker. “Picks for Key Government Posts Play Long Waiting Game.”
Washington Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/03/AR2009030303970_pf.html
(April 18, 2014).
58Shear, Michael D. and Howard Kurtz. “CNN’s Gupta Decides Against Surgeon General Position, Cites
‘Timing’.” March 6, 2009. Washington Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/05/AR2009030503310_pf.html
(April 18, 2014).
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not have even minimal qualifications (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis n.d.). They see an
appointment as a rung in the ladder leading to power and position in a political party
or interest group arena. For this reason, these job seekers could prefer appointments in
agencies that match their partisan or ideological preferences; this in turn complicates the
White House’s task of filling positions in ideologically divergent agencies (Lewis 2008, 2009).
How Pools of Potential Appointees Vary by Position
In addition to generally qualified, motivated, and loyal appointees who share similar goals,
presidents want appointees with specific substantive and functional expertise who can provide
counsel and implement policy initiatives in complex institutional and political contexts. The
Reagan transition team, for example, distilled onto a single notecard (Figure 2.1) what they
wanted in appointees.59
Figure 2.1: Reagan Transition Team’s Appointee Selection Criteria
59Thanks to Andrew Rudalevige for generously sharing this and other treasures from his archival research.
This notecard is located in the Annelise Anderson papers at the Hoover Institution (Stanford
University), Accession Number 90032-266267, Box 27, Folder: “Ronald Reagan presidential transition
team, 1980-1981: Basic Documents.”
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But even if presidents and their PPOs are learning and improving in the appointments
process, there might not be better appointees to select if the pools of potential appointees
are limited and every appointee cannot meet all criteria of interest to presidents: “Presidents
would prefer that all appointees be loyal, competent, and satisfy key political considerations,
but the pool of available appointees rarely satisfies all three considerations and presidents
must make tradeoffs” (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis n.d.). For some appointed positions,
the talent pool is deep and presidents have many options among potential appointees; for
other positions, however, the pool is limited due to the position’s managerial or substantive
demands or a higher level of public or media scrutiny because of the political salience or
appointment type, i.e. whether the appointment requires Senate confirmation or not.
Along with an increase in the number and size of executive branch agencies, the expansion
of the executive branch has also led to greater complexity and more technically demanding
positions. As a result, “postwar Presidents found that they needed people who were not
just generally competent, not just good politicians. They needed people who had specific
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kinds of professional background and technical training” (Mackenzie 1981, 84). Technical
positions with certain skill requirements—an engineering background for the National Sci-
ence Foundation’s Engineering Directorate or meteorological or oceanographic training for
the chief scientist’s position at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—can
limit the pool of potential appointees and make evaluating the qualifications of any aspiring
appointees difficult. As one PPO official related, “to the extent [positions] are technical,
[PPO] will defer to the agency” (quoted in Weko 1995, 125) because they do not have the
means to understand how to make use of the position or whom to put into it. For technically
demanding positions, the PPO struggles to both find additional applicants—especially ones
who meet the basic criteria valued by the president and required for the position—and then
gather more detailed information on any that seem promising. Compared to a low-level
staff assistant position, it takes “more than a political hack to provide adequate service as
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, as an Atomic Energy
Commissioner, or as head of the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice” (Mackenzie
1981, 84).
The combination of an immense work load and the background of PPO’s own personnel
(Mackenzie 1981) also suggests that it is difficult for PPO to make precise ex ante distinc-
tions between loyalty, competence, and patronage. PPO staff have greater political than
substantive or technical expertise (Mackenzie 1981; Weko 1995) and depend somewhat on
the recommendations of the higher-level appointees to fill subordinate positions (Nash 2000;
Weko 1995). Specifically highlighting PPO’s lack of capacity to evaluate technical require-
ments, Weko notes that, while “the technical complexity of positions subject to appointment
may be marginally greater” since Kennedy’s or Johnson’s relatively informal personnel op-
erations, “the president’s appointment staff made no more extensive efforts to master the
technical demands of appointive posts in 1981 than it did in 1965” (Weko 1995, 166 note
51).
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For most positions, members of Congress, governors, or party leaders often have long lists
of people to either recommend for specific jobs or for whom they request any job, as these
political actors can reap policy influence from getting their preferred appointee into place
or electoral benefit from patronage. Likewise, interest groups with policy demands often
provide highly motivated potential appointees with substantive expertise. For example,
Weko (1995, 142) describes how the Reagan administration relied on professional and other
external groups in its search for a director of the National Institutes of Health. But these
traditional sources of potential appointees, like the president, have little to gain from placing
someone in a demanding technical role for which they have few, if any, candidates at hand.
Senators might lack sufficient expertise to evaluate possible effects on agency performance
and have few recommendations for possible nominees, while interest groups might not have
expertise in areas that are not directly relevant to their policy priorities.
Related to but distinct from both the technical requirements of a job and its political,
policy, or administrative function is the level of specialization of functions. This distinction
exists in career positions as well (e.g. Foreign Service Specialists or Generalists). An ap-
pointed position better suited for a generalist might require both technical understanding
and broader management capabilities, while another job in the same office with the same
appointment authority might be more narrowly focused on a substantive or administrative
area. For example, in the State Department’s office for arms control, the principal deputy
assistant secretary (a more general, managerial position) and the special envoy for nuclear
nonproliferation (a more specialized position) are both SES positions and were filled by
non-career appointees in the Bush administration. The Prune Book series, published from
1988 to 2004 by Brookings Institution Press,60 details some of the most difficult and impor-
tant appointed positions that combine substantive or specialized complexity with extensive
managerial responsibilities.
60The series was also online following the 2008 election until early 2012:
http://web.archive.org/web/20090210055918/http://excellenceintransition.org/
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Conversely, one factor that could broaden the pool for a given position is the incidence of
similar positions either across the executive branch or within an agency; a need for common
skill sets across positions could mean that applicants need not be limited to consideration
for one position in one agency; instead, the PPO could consider them for various appoint-
ments. Candidates for the positions on one cabinet secretary’s advance team are also in the
running for the same function in another agency. For such positions the challenge is not
finding a sufficient supply of potential applicants; rather, it is narrowing down the field of
hopefuls. The incidence of a position might also interact with location, such as for U.S.
attorneys. While each regional or state-level position requires anticipating the preferences
of important stakeholders such as home state senators or influential local party or interest
groups, presidents can essentially outsource much of the search to these stakeholders, who
both expect more value from these positions and better understand the local dynamics. Bob
Nash, director of presidential personnel for President Clinton from 1995-2000, highlights the
contrast in effort required for common, compared to unique, positions:
So you [PPO] don’t really spend a lot of time unless there’s a specific challenge—
for example, over at the USDA [U.S. Department of Agriculture] there was an
SES. The position was in the rural utility service. I knew that the Secretary of
Agriculture and the person who ran the Rural Utility Service were looking for
somebody who could help implement this water 2000 project . . . . This person
needs to know about water projects and water improvement districts. So you
know that you have to have somebody who has worked with local governments
and financing. Whereas, if you were going to get an SES for congressional affairs,
you’ve got a hundred people walking around who have worked on the Hill and
you don’t spend much time (Nash 2000).
This comparative difficulty of finding someone from the pool of potential appointees for
more demanding SES positions like that in the Rural Utility Service is similar to the challenge
of filling PAS positions; some estimates suggest that, on average, presidentially appointed,
Senate-confirmed (PAS) positions do not have confirmed appointees for almost 25% of an
administration (O’Connell 2009).
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All of these factors indicate the importance of both presidential and potential appointee
perspectives in any examination of the appointment process, even though the institutional
features of the process, such as the president’s constitutional appointment authority and
the Senate’s advice and consent role, are more visible. Rather than a straightforward choice
made by the president without constraints, there are tensions between what presidents might
desire and what is available to them.
The Interaction of Intra-Presidential Time and Appointee Characteristics
These tensions are then exacerbated over time due to the limited pools of appointees and the
changing incentives and constraints for presidents and potential appointees. As their time in
office advances and key junctures such as reelection approach, presidents emphasize different
goals and desires over others; and their actions reflect this changing emphasis in areas such as
regulatory decisions (de Rugy and Davies 2009), grant allocation (Hudak 2012), appeals to
the public (Canes-Wrone 2005), and agency enforcement decisions (Hudak and Stack 2013).
In the case of appointments, both presidents and potential appointees are similarly aware of
and react to differing points in intra-presidential time.
With reelection already in mind at the beginning of their first terms, newly-inaugurated
presidents will want to get the most capable people right from the start. And with the
excitement of an election victory still fresh, potential appointees are most interested and
ready to make the transition an appointment would require. This convergence of interests at
the beginning of a new administration should thus translate into the initial appointee roster
having the highest qualifications, both politically and substantively:
H1: The general qualifications—political or substantive expertise and experience—of ap-
pointees are at their highest in the first year of intra-presidential time.
If all initial appointees remained in place throughout a term, only this initial level of char-
acteristics would be of interest to presidents and scholars alike. But because the turnover of
appointees is high (Chang, Lewis, and McCarty 2001; Dull and Roberts 2009; Heclo 1977;
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O’Connell 2009; Wood and Marchbanks 2007), especially at lower appointment levels, pres-
idents cannot rely on just the first round of appointments. From a presidential perspective,
the initial selection of the most qualified potential appointees from limited pools of available
talent means that the eventual replacements for the initial appointees will have less substan-
tive or functional capacity. And if potential appointees hold the conventional perception that
presidents are more powerful early in their administrations, there could be a negative feed-
back loop that makes this perception self-fulfilling. Presidents choose their top picks early
on, then other qualified potential appointees choose not to pursue or accept an appointment
later in the term because they see less potential for fulfilling their own personal, professional,
or political goals under a weakened president. And as the end of a term approaches, the
shortened time horizon diminishes the value of a position for potential appointees and makes
recruiting well-qualified candidates more difficult for the Presidential Personnel Office.
H2: The general qualifications—political or substantive expertise and experience—of ap-
pointees decline over intra-presidential time.
This general decline of qualifications or experience is likely, however, to affect political
and substantive expertise differently. For substantive experts outside government, the un-
certainty of an appointment—especially for Senate-confirmed positions—and the hectic pace
of Washington might become less attractive over time. Some who would have served initially
have moved on to other jobs or career paths instead of waiting patiently for an appointment;
and for positions with significant substantive or technical requirements, this further limits
an already shallow initial pool of candidates.
By contrast, there is a perception that there are legions of political hacks, campaign
staffers, and donors simply waiting for their commissions as appointees from the White
House. Given the historical losses in congressional elections for the party of the president
in mid-term elections and generally higher pay of executive branch positions compared to
jobs on Capitol Hill, there are hundreds of ambitious congressional staffers who might be
looking for work. And even if every campaign worker or former congressional staffer already
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has a job, there are think tank analysts, state legislative and executive branch personnel,
and interest group affiliates ready to take an appointment. For young, ambitious political
operatives, frequent job changes are the norm rather than the exception,61 so a short stint
as an appointee could be appealing at almost any point in an administration. Such an
appointment is the perfect stepping stone in anticipation of a long career in Washington—it
gives them opportunities to build their networks of contacts, adds cachet to a resume, and
pays better than many entry-level political jobs in Washington.
Based on this perception of a much deeper pool of potential appointees with more political
and less substantive backgrounds, political experience and connections of appointees might
not see the same decline as appointees’ substantive qualifications over time:
H3: The substantive qualifications of appointees decline over time.
H4: The political experience of appointees remains constant or increases over time.
An additional factor that might influence the greater decline in substantive qualifications
over intra-presidential time is the possibility of more persistent vacancies in technical or
challenging positions that require higher levels of substantive expertise. If initial appointees
leave prior to the end of a term, presidents could see potential benefits of leaving certain
positions vacant and using current appointees or careerists to fill those positions on an act-
ing basis. While allowing careerists to fill acting positions provides expertise advantages,
shifting appointees into acting roles might give presidents greater political responsiveness
while skipping the vetting and confirmation processes that delay the entry on duty of many
political appointees. And for openings late in a term, careerists face little of the learning
curve typical for political appointees, who spend much of the time in the position simply fig-
uring out what they are supposed to do and how to get it done. Unlike many unexperienced
appointees, careerists have “expertise in specific policy areas, familiarity with key stakehold-
ers, an understanding of the folkways and informal power relationships of the agency and its
61One Senate staffer I interviewed described how he had just moved to his third different position in just
over three years on the Hill, noting that this was fairly typical (personal interview, March 5, 2014).
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policy arena, and aspects of federal work as mundane as how the accounting, records, and
personnel systems work” (Lewis 2008, 144).
Do Presidents Improve Their Choices over Intra-Presidential Time?
Even if the pools of appointees are constrained, presidential selection of qualified appointees
might increase throughout a term. Some scholars have argued that presidents learn on the
job and develop some expertise that can slow or counteract other factors that diminish pres-
idential effectiveness over time. Just as there is the “cycle of declining influence,” Light
highlights the opposite cycle of increasing expertise (Light 1999). Specifically focusing on
appointments and the White House Presidential Personnel Office, Krause and O’Connell
(2013) suggest that this improvement results from leadership in the Presidential Personnel
Office that is getting better at its job; a more savvy PPO can, as an administration pro-
gresses in intra-presidential time, find and select more substantively qualified or competent
appointees rather than those who are seen as more loyal or “compliant.”62
But both my interviews with recent PPO staffers and earlier descriptive work on the
PPO suggests that the evidence for learning is, at best, mixed. This learning is contingent
on stability and continuity, yet turnover in PPO itself precludes such a learning environment.
One staffer from the George W. Bush PPO cited an example of the disruption in PPO, noting
that most of the appointment staffers from the Obama transition team that she worked with
just before and shortly after the 2008 election were no longer working on appointments after
inauguration.63 A former staffer in the Obama PPO described the experience as “climbing
62Krause and O’Connell (2013) argue that learning overcomes the challenge of starting from scratch with
each new administration: “For example, the Presidential Personnel Office, which plays a critical role in
agency staffing, turns over with each administration. Directors of the PPO at the start of a president’s
term often look for better plum jobs for themselves . . . . But as the term wears on, leadership settles and
the PPO staff becomes better at finding and vetting potential appointees.”
63Personal interview, March 4, 2014. This turnover included the initial personnel director for the transition
team, Jim Messina, who switched positions less than two weeks after election day to become deputy chief
of staff (see “President-elect Obama announces additional key White House staff,” press release,
November 16, 2008. http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_
announces_additional_key_white_house_staff/ (April 25, 2014)). Don Gips, Messina’s replacement,
had been working on the agency review teams for the Obama-Biden transition and was already slated for
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onto a treadmill that constantly accelerates;” another echoed this perception, comparing the
pace of work in PPO as much faster and more challenging than the pace at the highest levels
of the campaign organization in the run-up to the 2008 election.64 And Bob Nash, director of
PPO under Bill Clinton, recalled how little time and effort he could dedicate to evaluating
PPO’s collective performance; any time the PPO staff took to regroup and recharge was
spent on forward-looking strategy for pressing needs rather than systematic analysis of what
was working and what was not (Nash 2000).
2.3 Data, Measures, and Methods
To evaluate how presidential appointee characteristics change over time within an adminis-
tration, I analyze a dataset of the background characteristics of appointees in the George W.
Bush administration. These characteristics are coded from resumes of appointees obtained
by Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to almost 100 government agencies in late
May 2011. 53 agencies responded to the request for the names and resumes of all political
appointees in these agencies from January 2001 to May 2011, providing resumes for at least
some of the political appointees during the period of study. I focus on the 1,418 resumes for
appointees during the Bush administration, as these resumes provide a sample of appointee
characteristics for two full presidential terms.
This set of resumes, while extensive, is an incomplete sample of all appointees for sev-
eral reasons. While some agencies responded quickly and thoroughly to the FOIA request
for resumes, other agencies never responded to this specific request and other concurrent
requests for basic lists of current and past appointees or information on inspector general in-
vestigations (Lewis and Wood 2012). Though some agencies responded to the requests, they
an ambassadorship (personal interview, March 6, 2014). Gips was officially named as personnel director
on January 5, 2009 (see “Additional White House staff announced,” press release, January 5, 2009.
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/additional_white_house_staff_announced/ (April 25, 2014),
even as his tenure’s end was already planned for summer 2009.
64Personal interviews, March 2014, with Linda Jamison and Joanna Martin, both former special assistants
to the President in PPO.
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redacted most information—including the names of appointees and their qualifications for
the position—from the resumes, in direct contradiction of Department of Justice (DOJ) guid-
ance that describes the type of information that agencies should release after receiving FOIA
requests.65 Another limitation on getting background details on appointees is that agencies
are not required to keep the personnel records after an appointee (or any employee) leaves
the agency; they are supposed to send any such records to the National Personnel Records
Center within 120 days of an employee leaving an agency. These records do not necessarily
include the original resumes submitted by appointees when applying for the appointed posi-
tions.66 And for Senate-confirmed appointees, the agencies do not necessarily have resumes;
some responded to the FOIA request by printing out the appointees’ biographical sketches
from the agency websites.
The dataset includes information on the appointees’ positions—gathered from agency-
provided lists as well as from the Plum Book,67 the Federal Yellow Book leadership direc-
tories, and web searches—and appointee backgrounds from the agency-provided resumes.
Position details include the position title; start date for the appointment; agency, office or
bureau; appointment type (see Figure 2.2 below: presidentially appointed and Senate con-
firmed (PAS: 147; 10.4%), non-career Senior Executive Service (SES: 330; 23.3%), Schedule
C (SC: 904; 63.8%), or other excepted appointment (XS, PA: 37, 2.6%)); and pay plan and
65The DOJ guidance states that “civilian federal employees who are not involved in law enforcement
generally have no expectation of privacy regarding their names, titles, grades, salaries, and duty stations
as employees or regarding the parts of their successful employment applications” (Department of Justice
Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, 2009, p. 430-31.
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption6.pdf (April 22, 2014)).
66The Official Personnel Folders (OPF) sent to the NPRC contain the standard Office of Personnel
Management forms used by agency human resource offices, but not necessarily original resumes. Access
to the OPFs of former federal employees, including appointees, is slightly more restricted than what
records are nominally available from agencies through FOIA. See “Official Personnel Folders (OPF),
Federal (non-archival) Holdings and Access,”
http://www.archives.gov/st-louis/civilian-personnel/index.html (April 22, 2014).
67The Plum Book, so called for its cover’s color, is officially titled United States Government Policy and
Supporting Positions, and is produced each presidential election year by either the Senate’s Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs or the House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform. It includes a listing of positions that can potentially be filled by presidential
appointment outside the traditional civil service selection process for executive branch agencies.
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grade. These counts are for new appointments made in each year rather than changing
composition of the appointee team.
Figure 2.2: New Appointee Resumes by Appointment Type, 2001-2008
The resumes provide details on the backgrounds of appointees prior to their work in the
administration; thus an appointee moving from one appointed position in the administration
to another position would not get credit for the experience or expertise gained through the
initial appointment in the administration. The dataset includes measures of education level
(0-4; 1.52); subject or policy area expertise (0,1; 42.1%); specific task experience (0,1; 73.2%);
previous federal or agency work (0,1; 25.2%); appointment in previous administration (0,1;
11.5%); work for the Bush/Cheney campaign (0,1; 25.8%), transition teams (0,1; 2.2%), or
inauguration committees (0,1; 6.7%); prior experience working for the Republican Party at
the local, state, or national level (0,1; 34.5%); number of previous campaigns (0-25; 1.1); and
whether the appointee’s previous job immediately before the appointment was political in
nature (0,1; 63.1%). Another measure indicates whether the appointee worked in the White
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House of the Bush administration prior to appointment to an agency (0,1; 7.8%). I excluded
resumes on which the most relevant information had been redacted, such as education or
prior work experience; most agencies redacted relatively little information, but others, such
as the Department of the Navy, systematically redacted all substantive content, leaving only
the category headings (Education, Work Experience, Honors/Awards, etc.) on the resumes.
I included resumes that included most information but had one or two areas blank, coding
those categories as missing rather than 0.68
The sample of resumes is also limited in that there are more from the second term (868,
61.2%) of the Bush administration than the first (550, 38.8%), suggesting that the estimates
for second term characteristics are more precise than for the first term. There is a broad
sample of agency types and sizes among those that did respond, but there could be some
systematic bias due to the selection effect of agencies that did not send resumes.
Methods
From the measures of experience gleaned from the resumes, I distinguish between those
that contribute to either substantive or political expertise. For substantive qualifications,
I group together characteristics that are associated in the presidency literature primarily
with competence (e.g. Lewis and Waterman 2013), whether such competence is the result of
specific work experience or educational training: education level, subject and task experience,
or previous positions in the federal government (especially if in the same agency as the current
appointment).69 For political experience or expertise, I include the measures that indicate
whether or not the appointee’s previous job was of a political nature; work for the presidential
campaign, transition team, or various inauguration committees; a White House position in
68Coding details for both the resumes and position details are in the appendix.
69I do not distinguish here between those appointees in the Bush administration with prior federal
experience due to a presidential appointment in prior administrations or because of a career position in a
federal agency; of the 327 appointees in the data who have federal experience, about half (159) were
appointed in a prior administration. Regardless of the circumstances of prior federal experience, these
appointees have at least some substantive experience based on that service.
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the Bush administration or congressional staff experience prior to any appointment in the
administration; or work for the Republican party at a local, state, or national level.
I compare the proportions of appointees with these characteristics in the first and second
term, and then provide additional detail on how they change year by year across a full
8-year administration. I also estimate probit models of whether or not appointees have
certain characteristics using first and second terms and post-election year indicators as key
independent variables. These models include controls for level of appointment (PAS, SES,
or SC) and agency fixed effects; and I use robust standard errors to adjust for the violation
of the assumption that all observations are independent.
2.4 Results
The analyses generally confirm the expectations that appointees are less substantively qual-
ified over the course of intra-presidential time and that political experience is fairly constant
across an administration. The results also suggest that appointments made immediately
following elections emphasize political experience or are simply patronage rewards for sup-
porters and campaign personnel. And if these appointees are a key source of presidential
influence or capacity, the findings suggest that presidents suffer from declining appointee
effectiveness, especially in the second term.
First Look
The first broad hypothesis builds on the general perception that there are first-string and
second-string appointees due to differing motivations between presidents and potential ap-
pointees, especially as an administration’s power waxes or wanes. A comparison of appointee
characteristics from Bush’s first term to second term (see Table 2.1) shows that this percep-
tion is correct in certain areas of experience or expertise. While the initial levels of prior
federal or agency experience, whether appointed or in a career position, are quite low already,
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Table 2.1: Comparing First and Second Term Appointee Characteristics
First Term Second Term Difference Significant
Substantive Qualifications
Previous Agency Experience 0.11 0.06 -0.05 X
Previous Appointee Experience 0.17 0.08 -0.09 X
Education Level 0.39 0.38 -0.01
Federal Government Experience 0.28 0.21 -0.07 X
Subject Expertise 0.46 0.40 -0.06 X
Task Experience 0.73 0.73 0.00
Political Experience
Campaign Work 0.24 0.28 0.04
Congressional Experience 0.39 0.32 -0.07 X
Party Work 0.33 0.37 0.04
Prior Political Job 0.65 0.62 -0.03
Transition & Inauguration 0.09 0.09 0.00
Previous White House Position 0.05 0.10 0.05 X
Xindicates difference of means is significant at 0.05 level for two-tailed tests.
the decline in these levels from first to second terms is both substantively and statistically
significant. And though the higher first term level of subject area expertise is not as high
as proponents of “neutral competence” (Heclo 1975) might think is sufficient, the decrease
is substantively less striking, albeit still statistically significant. Education and task experi-
ence are relatively unchanged across terms, with task experience slightly higher in the second
term.
In contrast with substantive qualifications, the measures of political experience decline
little or even increase in the second term. The measure for the appointee’s previous job as po-
litical or not is lower, but other measures of political experience—work for the Bush/Cheney
campaign or the Republican Party—are higher. Second term appointees are also more likely
to have had earlier appointments in the White House. And the measure of work on the tran-
sition team in 2000-2001 or on inaugurations in 2001 or 2005 remains low in both terms.70
70I also analyze these indicators separately, with transition being higher in the first term and inauguration
higher in the second term. Given the unique situation of the 2000 election and transition period,
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To further understand distinctive results between the measures of substantive qualifica-
tions and politically-focused experience from the first to the second term, I test the second
and third hypotheses by evaluating the changes in these characteristics by years across both
terms. The second hypothesis posits that substantive expertise will decline over the course
of an administration because of limited labor pools. Figure 2.3 below illustrates that there
are generally declines in the levels of the various characteristics associated with substantive
competence, except for education levels and task experience. The strongest evidence of this
fall in capacity is highlighted by the drop in prior work in federal government agencies and
previous agency-specific experience. And even with some relative increases depending on
the year, subject area expertise declines overall throughout the administration.
Thus when presidents are looking for appointees with either “neutral” (Heclo 1975) or
“responsive” (Moe 1985) competence, the pool of potential appointees with significant expe-
rience at the federal level appears extremely shallow—especially for lower level appointees.
The proportion of PAS appointees with federal experience is the same across both terms,
with around 50% having worked in the executive branch prior to appointment in the Bush
administration. For SES and SC appointees, however, the proportions go from 42% and 19%
in the first term to 31% and 12% in the second.
In contrast to these declining indicators of substantive capacity, hypothesis 3 highlights
the expectation—initially supported by the broader aggregation of characteristics across
terms—that political characteristics will remain constant or increase over the course of an
administration. But the yearly measures (see Figure 2.4) suggest that there are dramatic
increases immediately following the election or reelection of the president—but a general
decline overall. These election-related spikes in characteristics such as campaign or party
work could reflect a president’s desire to reward loyal supporters as well as the need for
trusted appointees. Arguably the most valuable asset—to presidents—is a demonstrated
lower-than-expected levels of experience on either the transition or first inauguration would not be
surprising.
71
Figure 2.3: Appointee Substantive Qualifications, 2001-2008
understanding of the president’s political goals and perspectives and the capability to help
a president meet those goals. There are relatively few ways through which prospective
appointees can acquire this capacity or signal such loyalty to presidents, and work on the
campaign trail is the predominant course for doing so. The decline in campaign or party
experience among appointees later in terms could indicate that the most capable campaign
workers were appointed early on or there are simply fewer of them available or interested
from whom presidents can choose.
In contrast to the other measures of political experience in Figure 2.4, the proportion of
appointees with congressional connections exhibits a steady decline across both terms. The
slight increases in 2006 and 2007 could stem from a surge of staffers either anticipating or
having suffered layoffs following the Republican losses in the 2006 midterm elections.71
71In 2007, I encountered one such erstwhile congressional staffer who, having secured a Schedule C
appointment at the Department of Energy after losing his position on a congressman’s staff following the
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Figure 2.4: Appointee Political Qualifications, 2001-2008
Econometric Models
For more precise analysis of the effects of time on characteristics, I estimate probit regression
models for each characteristic of interest. These models specifically focus on the differences
between appointees’ characteristics in post-election years, between first and second terms,
and between appointment types.72 Table 2.2 below shows that substantive experience is rela-
tively unchanged in post-election years compared to other years, but the differences between
terms, like those illustrated in Figure 2.3 above, are both substantively and statistically sig-
nificant. Controlling for appointment type highlights that this decline from the first to second
terms is primarily among Schedule C appointees—even as they are becoming increasingly
important for both political and policy reasons (Lewis and Waterman 2013).
To illustrate the substantive interpretation of these findings, I calculate the predicted
defeat of his boss in the 2006 midterms, was already concerned about losing his Schedule C position
following the 2008 presidential election.
72The agency fixed effects model loses many observations from agencies with few appointees and no
variation in the dependent variable, but the results are substantively and statistically similar even with
the additional observations available when not controlling for agency effects.
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Table 2.2: Substantive Expertise over Intra-Presidential Time
Previous
Education Federal Agency Subject Task
Time
Post-Election -0.17 0.00 0.30* 0.11 0.08
(0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09)
Term 0.04 -0.25* -0.39* -0.30* -0.16
(0.15) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09)
Appointment Type
PAS 0.17 1.22* 0.89* 1.40* 0.79*
(0.21) (0.19) (0.27) (0.19) (0.23)
SES 0.38* 0.67* 0.81* 0.98* 0.81*
(0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11)
N 1,144 1,242 1,096 1,232 1,207
Estimates are from probit regression models, with robust standard
errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 0.05 level;
models include fixed effects for agencies.
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probabilities for whether appointees are likely to have specific qualifications based on being
appointed in either the first or second term. The change from first to second term, for
example, decreases the probability that appointees have subject-area expertise to just 0.34,
compared to 0.45 for first term appointees (see Figure 2.5). Except for education levels,
the probabilities for appointees having other characteristics associated with competence also
drop in the second term.
Figure 2.5: Predicted Probabilities for Appointee Characteristics (1)
Political experience, by contrast, tends to increase both in post-election years and in the
second term—except for congressional experience. Table 2.3 indicates that these increases
are, like for substantive qualifications, driven by changes in the Schedule C appointees.
Political experience among these lower-level appointees is holding constant or increasing, as
expected, while higher-level appointees are less politically qualified.
Calculating predicted probabilities for party work experience, for example, shows that
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Table 2.3: Political Experience over Intra-Presidential Time
Transition &
Congress Political Party Campaign Inauguration White House
Time
Post-Election 0.02 0.27* 0.22* 0.34* 0.41* 0.26*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Term -0.24* -0.04 0.24* 0.24* 0.09 0.37*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
Appointment Type
PAS -0.51* -0.72* -1.00* -1.70* -1.04* -0.16
(0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.47) (0.50) (0.25)
SES 0.29* -0.39* -0.55* -0.40* -0.37* -0.21
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
N 1,211 1,199 1,212 1,186 1,178 1,207
Estimates are from probit regression models, with robust standard errors in
parentheses. * indicates significance at 0.05 level; models include agency fixed effects.
the probability of having such experience increases from 0.33 in the first term to 0.42 in the
second (see Figure 2.6). While the likelihoods of having worked on Capitol Hill or holding a
political job immediately prior to appointment decrease in the second term, other political
experience is more likely after the president’s reelection.
One limitation of the dataset is that early appointees in the administration who then
receive subsequent appointments in different positions or agencies do not get credit for the
experience gained from the initial appointment; the number of appointees who move up or
around during the administration would add to the levels of substantive experience. Without
more precise information on how many appointees receive multiple appointments within the
same administration, estimating the effect on overall characteristic levels remains a challenge.
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Probabilities for Appointee Characteristics (2)
2.5 Conclusion
Presidential influence over policy-making could decline over intra-presidential time for many
reasons. In the legislative arena, it might simply be that most easily-shifted policies are
already moved closer to a president’s ideal point; any remaining policies are unlikely to move
because of institutional features that create multiple veto points and consequent gridlock
(Krehbiel 1996). It could be that the public has lost interest, so “going public” does not
help a president sway either public opinion or congressional positions (Canes-Wrone 2001).
But for management of the executive branch, it could be that the capacity of leadership and
supporting appointees has changed over the course of an administration.
Controlling the executive branch agencies to obtain political and policy benefits is an
enormous challenge for the small organizations led by presidents who function under chal-
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lenging time and institutional constraints; appointments are a critical strategy that pres-
idents employ to influence agency decisions and outputs. Ideally, presidents would have
complete information and time to recruit the best possible appointees to provide a perfect
blend of political and policy benefits; but there are limits on the political capital and in-
stitutional capacity presidents have and will expend on appointments. And, as the results
above suggest, these limitations become more pronounced as the most qualified and loyal
appointees have begun to leave—and finding replacements as qualified or effective as the
initial appointees is difficult. This could result from either limited initial labor markets from
which presidents can select appointees or that some positions have become less attractive to
potential appointees with the characteristics that presidents want.
The difference in declining substantive qualifications between Senate-confirmed and lower-
level appointees also reiterates the perpetual concern about patronage. As even the designer
of the appointment power acknowledged, without the check of Senate confirmation, presi-
dents would be tempted to appoint “candidates who had no other merit than that of coming
from the same State . . . or of being in some way or other personally allied to [the president], or
of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instru-
ments of his pleasure” (Hamilton 1788c). The findings above indicate that this temptation
seems most powerful immediately following an election, as campaign workers and party loy-
alists are ready for their rewards; and then, as the pools of substantively qualified candidates
run empty toward the end of an administration, presidents again have plentiful politically
experienced candidates from which to choose.
Another important implication of these results is the effect of new—and less qualified—
appointees, especially lower-level Schedule C appointees, entering into existing organizational
teams at different stages of an administration. If presidents make appointments in teams
or groups rather than in isolation, these new entrants could disrupt established leadership
teams that have finally gotten up to speed on handling the myriad challenges facing their
particular agency. This reiterates how the high rates of turnover among appointees could
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damage agency performance—not just by the departure of the initial appointees, but also
because of the arrival of new team members without the same capacity, perspective, or
attachment to the existing leadership group.
As challenging as the initial appointments process is for presidents and their personnel op-
erations, this paper highlights how finding and appointing replacements for initial appointees
can be even more demanding. Because of limited pools of potential appointees from which to
choose and the often competing motivations of those most able to successfully fill appointed
positions, presidents cannot expect that their power to appoint can easily overcome other
influences that diminish or constrain their power over intra-presidential time.
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CHAPTER 3
Striped Pants versus Fat Cats:
Ambassadorial Performance of
Career Diplomats and Political Appointees
Abstract
With the 20th-century expansion of the executive branch and presidents’ increas-
ingly sophisticated efforts to control it, understanding the effects of presidential per-
sonnel choices on governance and bureaucratic performance is more important than
ever. A growing literature on bureaucratic performance focuses on differences in per-
formance of programs or agencies led by either careerists or political appointees; yet
this literature still struggles to measure and then compare performance across agencies
or separate the individual performance of careerists and appointees from agency or
program performance. By examining ambassadorial performance at U.S. embassies,
this paper provides both new performance measures and analysis of individual- and
organization-level differences in performance due to the influence of either careerist or
appointed leadership. To test the personal and institutional characteristics that affect
ambassadorial performance, I construct a new dataset using embassy inspection reports
by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and State Depart-
ment biographies. With these data, I find that the traditional dichotomy of careerists
versus appointees explains some performance differences in comparable institutional
settings, but that the individual-level characteristics such as language or regional ex-
perience that are expected to affect performance are not influential. These findings
have important implications for presidents in their approach to appointee selection, for
agencies in how they measure and evaluate performance, and for our understanding of
the influence of leaders, both careerists and appointees, on agency performance.
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the Southern Political
Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 9-11. I am grateful to Caroline Drinnon for her work
in collecting and coding data on ambassadors and embassies. And I thank my colleagues at the Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions for their helpful comments throughout the development of this
project and participants in Vanderbilt’s Graham Symposium for their feedback.
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Introduction
On July 2, 1881, Charles Guiteau shot President James Garfield as retribution for Garfield’s
refusal to appoint Guiteau as ambassador to Vienna or consul general to Paris (Peskin 1977).
Patronage excesses and scandals after the Civil War had produced calls for reform of the
government bureaucracies, and Garfield’s assassination by this disgruntled and delusional
campaign worker was the tipping point for the passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883. The
Pendleton Act and other civil service reforms that followed were based in part on the concept
of a clearly discernible demarcation between politics and administration. As one prominent
political scientist (and future president) put it in 1887, “most important to be observed is the
truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers; namely,
that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are
not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be
suffered to manipulate its offices” (Wilson 1887, emphasis in the original).
This view of administration emphasized improvement in both personnel and organiza-
tion as the two critical elements of better policy implementation. Reformers argued that
expert personnel, protected from the political whims of any given administration, could at-
tain a higher objective standard of performance than appointees who were given jobs, not
because of their qualifications or expertise, but as “a recognition of past services or perhaps
a credit toward future considerations” for a candidate or party (Mackenzie 1981, xix). Abun-
dant anecdotal evidence—both then and now—suggests that such “patronage” appointments
distributed among campaign workers and donors results in poor agency performance, cor-
ruption, and low morale among more public-spirited government workers (e.g. Heclo 1977;
Lewis 2008); and all modern candidates and presidents of both parties promise to adopt good
governance best practices and pledge not to appoint special interest lobbyists or unqualified
hacks to important positions. Demonstrating the performance advantages of career civil ser-
vants, a slew of internal federal government and external organization awards for achievement
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and innovation highlight outstanding performance by careerists across all federal agencies.74
One frequently cited example of this contrast between politically connected but incompetent
appointees and dutiful, expert careerists is presidential appointment of ambassadors at U.S.
embassies abroad.75
Yet recent scandals, such as lavish spending on conferences by the General Services
Administration76 and a top Environmental Protection Agency policymaker defrauding the
agency of almost $1 million,77 seem to contradict the conventional wisdom that careerists are
(less) immune from corruption. Conversely, there are political appointees with exceptional
abilities who reenergize agencies and lead innovative programs, such as James Lee Witt at
the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the 1990s (Lewis 2008). These examples
of corrupt careerists and outstanding appointees raise the questions of whether careerists
systematically perform better than political appointees and what factors, either in lead-
ers’ personal backgrounds or institutional features, might contribute to any differences in
performance. Understanding appointee performance matters for presidents and the public
who hold them accountable. Presidents want to know if their appointment strategies and
appointees are contributing to achieving their policy and electoral goals, while the general
public needs information on performance to hold elected leaders accountable.
This paper examines ambassadorships, a category of appointed positions normally ig-
74See e.g. the Roger W. Jones Award for Executive Leadership, awarded annually by American
University’s Department of Public Administration and Policy:
http://www.american.edu/spa/dpap/Roger-Jones-History.cfm.
75A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing highlighted the stereotypical
donor-turned-ambassador who had a difficult time answering basic questions about the country to which
he was assigned; see Smith, Alexander. 2014. “Obama under fire after appointing major donor as
Norway envoy.” January 24, 2014. http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/\unhbox\voidb@x\bgroup\let\
unhbox\voidb@x\setbox\@tempboxa\hbox{n\global\mathchardef\accent@spacefactor\
spacefactor}\accent18n\egroup\spacefactor\accent@spacefactorews/2014/01/24/22429336-
obama-under-fire-after-appointing-major-donor-as-norway-envoy (January 27, 2014).
76Rein, Lisa and Timothy R. Smith. 2012. “GSA conference went ‘over the top.’ ” Washington Post. April
4, 2012. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-04/politics/35451518_1_administrator-
martha-johnson-awards-ceremony-gsa-event-planner (January 27, 2014).
77Simpson, Ian. 2013. “Ex-EPA adviser admits to fraud, CIA stint claim, 13 years of lies,” Reuters,
September 27, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-usa-crime-epa-idUSBRE98Q12J20130927
(January 27, 2014).
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nored in the bureaucratic politics and performance literatures, to explain how presidential
personnel choices and the specific characteristics of agency leaders, whether appointees or
careerists, influence performance at the individual and agency levels. Ambassadorships offer
both substantive and practical advantages to studying the connection between presidential
personnel choices and agency performance: 1) though highly visible in presidential politics
and foreign policy, we know little systematically about ambassadors and embassy perfor-
mance; 2) both appointees and careerists fill these positions in comparable bureaucratic
contexts; and 3) the availability of comparable measures of performance across contexts
avoids some limitations of earlier measures.
Ambassadors have historically been at the heart of the debate over appointments and
performance, as they have played prominent roles in American history, both in pivotal crises
such as the struggle for independence from Great Britain and in patronage scandals and
inter-branch conflicts over presidential power. Attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and
personnel—most recently in Libya, Egypt, and Yemen78—also highlight the visibility of am-
bassadors and embassies to foreign audiences. These positions and the embassies in which
they are located also share important functional characteristics with many other federal
executive positions and offices, making findings generalizable to other contexts within the
federal executive establishment. And ambassadorships provide methodological leverage for
evaluating performance because of a large available sample, variation both across type of ap-
pointee (careerist and non-careerist) and within type (background characteristics) for similar
positions with uniform appointment criteria and legal authority, and a statutorily-designed
evaluation scheme with clear criteria for performance.
I outline below what we know about presidential appointments and performance, the
problems that scholars confront in explaining and measuring performance, and the literature
78See e.g. Ghobari, Mohammed and Edmund Blair. “U.S. embassies attacked in Yemen, Egypt after Libya
envoy killed,” Reuters, September 13, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-protests-idUSBRE88C0J320120913 (February 3,
2014).
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on ambassadors. Drawing on historical background on ambassadorial appointments and how
modern ambassadors and embassies function, I then articulate why evaluating ambassadorial
performance can contribute to this literature by providing an initial evaluation of individual
and management team level performance of different types of appointees and careerists in the
same position. Following a description of the data and methods for examining ambassadorial
performance, I discuss the empirical analyses that highlight the influence of individual level
characteristics of ambassadors. I conclude by outlining the implications of these findings
for future study of performance and changes to bureaucratic practice to improve agency
management.
3.1 Choice and Consequence:
Presidential Personnel Choices and Performance
A growing literature explores how presidential personnel choices are inseparable from agency
performance. Scholars have long focused on one key aspect of performance as agency respon-
siveness to presidential political control, and extensive empirical evidence underscores the
theoretical expectations that appointee placement and ideology influence agency responsive-
ness. Another important aspect of performance is defined as objective or general management
performance. While initial studies of objective management performance suggest that ap-
pointees perform worse than careerists, scholars still struggle to overcome the limitations of
available performance measures, making explanation and evaluation of performance at the
individual position level and in comparable bureaucratic contexts difficult. These studies
descriptively use qualitative data on a broad range of position types, from ambassadors to
Schedule C staff assistants, to explain possible performance differences; but, empirically, they
have focused only on the specific position types for which quantitative data are more readily
available. For an entire class of highly visible presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed
appointees—ambassadors—we are beginning to understand how presidents systematically
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select them but have only scattered anecdotes regarding their performance. Research on
ambassadors and their performance could provide insight into this specific appointee group
and bureaucratic performance generally.
Performance as Responsiveness to Political Principals
Presidents seek to politicize the executive branch bureaucracy by controlling the number
and penetration of appointees (Nathan 1975; Lewis 2008). They see appointments as instru-
ments for dealing with “the inevitably changing short-term pressures of presidential politics”
(Moe 1985, 152) and as opportunities for rewarding political supporters—even if agency per-
formance suffers as a result (Lewis 2008). Thus presidents, driven by electoral and other
political goals as well as by policy interests or desire for general good management, seek to
identify and appoint people who demonstrate “responsive” (Moe 1985) rather than “neu-
tral” (Heclo 1975; Kaufman 1956) competence. Such competence depends in large measure
on political skills used in establishing relationships with important stakeholders, managing
strategic agency actions to meet political needs, and articulating policy goals that match
a president’s agenda (Maranto 2011). Presidents ideally want appointees who understand
presidential priorities and have substantive expertise relevant to the agency in which they
will work (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis n.d.).
Beginning with regulatory commissions (Moe 1982; Stewart and Cromartie 1982; Wood
and Waterman 1991, 1994), scholars have traced changes in bureaucratic performance stem-
ming from shifts in the partisanship and ideology of presidents and their appointees. Other
work finds similar effects on the extent and timing of agency enforcement actions to illus-
trate agency responsiveness to presidential political or policy needs (Hudak and Stack 2013;
Stewart and Cromartie 1982). Distributive agencies provide other examples of responsive-
ness, whether in Nixon’s efforts to reshape welfare policy through personnel changes as he
approached and won reelection (Randall 1979) or the award of grants and contracts to key
constituencies or regions (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Gordon 2011; Hudak 2012).
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The Challenge of Defining and Measuring Management Performance
While presidents might define performance as a function of agency or appointee responsive-
ness to presidential goals, “for members of Congress, clients of the agency, or other interested
parties, the definition of good performance is likely to differ” (Lewis 2007, 1075). Civil ser-
vants have policy or ideological preferences of their own and might be frustrated by the
constantly changing priorities and demands from political appointees (Clinton et al. 2012),
and public sector unions would prefer that the high level jobs were reserved for careerists.
Both agency employees and the recipients of goods and services provided by agencies could
be frustrated by degradation in general management performance due to presidential prior-
itization of patronage and politicization.
Because the agencies within which appointees and civil servants work were designed not
just for objective performance but also to meet either short- or long-term political goals of the
designers (Lewis 2003), presidential selection of appointees and their subsequent performance
often reveal these tensions between political goals and institutional management—or, in
Wilson’s characterization, the inherent conflict between “politics” and “administration.”
Focusing on objective management performance rather than responsiveness to the competing
demands of political principals, scholars have argued that careerists are better equipped
to manage agencies and programs than appointees because of agency-specific experience,
longer tenures, and management skills developed in the public, rather than private, context
(Chang, Lewis, and McCarty 2001; Heclo 1977; Lewis 2008). In contrast, appointees could
bring a “constant infusion of new blood” into agencies that provides “fresh ideas and greater
sensitivity to other groups and sectors of society” as well as “exceptional energy and zeal
to their brief periods of public service that are hard for long-service bureaucrats to match”
(Bok 2003, 264). Such energy and external perspective might lead to better management
performance in addition to the presidential goal of greater responsiveness.
To arbitrate between such competing claims, scholars have taken several approaches to
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studying objective performance of careerists and appointees, including measuring budget
forecasting accuracy, comparing internal program evaluation scores, and fielding surveys of
agency employees. Drawing on previous literature in economics and fiscal political economy,
Krause, Douglas, and Lewis (2006) evaluate state-level budget forecasting and the effects of
different personnel systems on the accuracy of those forecasts. They find that forecasting
done by state agencies with distinct personnel systems for supervisory versus subordinate
levels, such as systems in which gubernatorial appointees manage careerists, was more accu-
rate.
Another approach has focused on performance measures derived from a management
evaluation tool designed and implemented by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
during George W. Bush’s first term. This grading scheme, called the Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART), relied on input from agency managers and OMB examiners about
a given agency’s program design, strategic planning, program management, and results
(Gilmour and Lewis 2006). In one example of work using PART scores to compare per-
formance, Gilmour and Lewis (2006) use the scores from 234 programs to compare programs
led by PAS appointees with those run by Senior Executive Service careerists; they find that
appointee-led programs averaged lower scores on multiple management measures. To more
specifically evaluate background characteristics associated with performance, Lewis (2007)
explores the effects of previous bureau experience, length of tenure, and education levels on
performance. While appointees have higher levels of academic credentials and private man-
agement experience, programs administered by careerists, with more experience and longer
tenures, received higher PART evaluations (Lewis 2007). Demonstrating that programs led
by appointees whose primary experience was on political campaigns performed worse than
those led by either careerists or other appointees, Gallo and Lewis suggest that the limited
substantive or task experience of these appointees negatively affects program performance as
reflected in lower PART scores (2012). And combining PART scores with survey responses
from agency employees in the Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS), Lewis demonstrates
87
that agencies with higher proportions of appointee managers score lower on both measures
than those agencies with fewer appointees (Lewis 2008).
These and other studies seem to validate the extensive qualitative literature and jour-
nalistic accounts of the detrimental effect of appointee management on objective agency or
program performance. Yet each of the measures used—budget forecasts, PART scores, and
survey responses—suffers from limitations that make valid inference difficult across positions,
agencies, and administrations. Budget forecasting is a unique technical task that might not
be generalizable to other agencies or programs (Gallo and Lewis 2012). One concern about
PART scores is the disparate levels of response effort among agencies along ideological or
partisan lines (Lavertu, Lewis, and Moynihan n.d.); another critique indicates that scores
could reflect executive expertise at fulfilling the PART process itself rather than program
performance (Gilmour 2006). And survey responses of federal workers “rely on the impres-
sions of federal employees who may or may not be close enough to agency senior leaders to
accurately evaluate performance” (Gallo and Lewis 2012, 221).
These shortcomings reflect the numerous challenges to comparing the effect of appointees
on performance across agencies: “it is hard to compare executives and agencies against each
other since agencies have different mandates, operating environments, and constraints . . . .
It requires an acceptable definition of good performance, an identification of the universe
of federal bureau chiefs, an acceptable grading scheme, willingness on the part of federal
executives to participate, and an approach that is sensitive to differences among federal
programs” (Lewis 2007, 1075). Comparing performance across individual agency or office
leaders is similarly difficult, as many positions are either not comparable across agencies
or there is no variation between careerists and appointees in a given position. Performance
measures like PART or survey responses are agency or program level measures, reflecting the
capacities and efforts of many people; individual performance data are either not collected
at all or, in the case of yearly individual evaluations, are not available even in aggregate form
due to privacy law.
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What We Know about American Ambassadors
There is an entire class of appointed positions—ambassadorships—with features that might
address some of the shortcomings of extant studies of performance described above. Al-
though presidents typically make more than 200 ambassadorial nominations in a single term,
we know little systematically about ambassadorial appointments and performance. There
is descriptive and historical work, often focused on specific ambassadors or foreign policy
crises; frequent mentions in the press and scholarly literature on appointments about the
propriety and consequences of appointing campaign donors to ambassadorships; and a lim-
ited theoretical and empirical literature on the selection of ambassadors. What we do not
know reflects the limitations of the bureaucratic performance literature generally: Are these
positions generalizable to other contexts in the executive branch? What affects performance
individually and collectively? And is there an agreed-upon definition of performance and a
way to measure it?
All ambassadorships are subject to presidential appointment and Senate confirmation,
and thus all ambassadors—regardless of professional background—could be described as
presidential or political appointees. As ambassadorial vacancies occur, especially at the
beginning of a new presidential term, State Department leadership and the White House
Presidential Personnel Office jointly determine those positions that career diplomats will fill
and those that non-career appointees will take. Though there are some positions that have
historically been filled almost exclusively by one type or the other, many ambassadorships
alternate between types. The State Department provides lists of possible careerist candidates
for the designated careerist positions to the White House for final consideration, and the
Presidential Personnel Office develops candidate lists for the other positions. The president
then makes the formal appointments for all positions. In this paper, I refer to presidentially
appointed ambassadors who are career Foreign Service officers as “career diplomats” or
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“careerists” and to those who are not as “political appointees.”79 Since 1960, the allocation
of ambassadorships has fluctuated around 65% careerists and 35% political appointees.
Much of the descriptive work on ambassadors, both careerists and political appointees,
comes from firsthand memoirs or historical accounts. Edited collections of interviews with
former ambassadors provide an in-depth look at ambassadorships, from selection to training,
from arrival at post to the departure for home (e.g. Mak and Kennedy 1992; Morgan and
Kennedy 2004); the interviews themselves are part of an ongoing oral history project run
by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST).80 The American Foreign
Service Association maintains data on ambassadorial appointments since 1960, as well as
links to media reports on ambassadorial appointments and ambassadorial performance.81
Along with descriptive material, the commentary from journalists, foreign policy practi-
tioners, and scholars that accompanies every announcement of a prominent ambassadorial
appointee highlights the salience of ambassadors in the broader debate about patronage, qual-
ifications and expertise, and presidential prerogatives in the appointments process. George
Kennan, a diplomat famous for his contribution to—and later criticism of—the design of the
Truman administration’s policy of “containment” and the Marshall Plan, articulated the case
against presidential prerogatives in ambassadorial appointments. Decrying the “entrenched
political control of the foreign service,” Kennan argued that the appointment of non-career
ambassadors is just one of many factors that frustrate diplomats, hinder recruitment efforts,
and damage the conduct of foreign policy (1997, 203). Echoing Kennan, another former
career ambassador focused on the patronage aspect of some political appointments to am-
bassadorships, urging both candidates in the 2008 presidential election to end the practice
of appointing campaign donors to ambassadorships: “it is untenable for a great power, a
79This follows the convention of the American Foreign Service Association, which categorizes ambassadors
as either “career” or “political.” See http://www.afsa.org/ambassadors.aspx. Other scholars have
used “professional” or “foreign service” and “nonprofessional” to characterize ambassadors of differing
backgrounds (e.g. Hollibaugh 2014).
80The collection is available from ADST at http://adst.org/oral-history/ or the Library of Congress
at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ (January 28, 2014).
81Available at http://www.afsa.org/ambassadors.aspx (January 28, 2014).
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global power, to entrust its frontline national security managers—ambassadors—to used car
salesmen, hairdressers, art dealers and strip mall developers, as it has in the recent past . . . .
It is time to end the last great vestige of the 19th-century spoils system. The American
people, our foreign policy, our national security, and our current and future career Foreign
Service officers deserve better” (Bodine 2008).
From a presidential perspective, however, ambassadorships should be under political
control just like other senior policymaking positions. A former staffer in the Presidential
Personnel Office who was responsible for selecting political appointee ambassadors recalls
how careerists in the State Department were highly resistant to political appointees and did
not recognize “how important proximity to the president could be.”82 This proximity can
provide presidents with information that does not get filtered through the State Department
hierarchy in “a bad game of telephone.”83 Responding to the critiques of Kennan and others
about political appointees, one former non-career ambassador argues that, “[by] resisting
the legitimacy of political appointments essential to presidential control, [the Foreign Ser-
vice] inevitably rejects as well the legitimacy of political direction” (Silberman 1979). And
presidents defend what critics derisively call “patronage” appointments broadly and in am-
bassadorships specifically on the grounds that “what some appointees lack in demonstrated
credentials, they make up for in general competence and a close connection to the president.
Indeed, the connections and experience that come with work for the campaign or party may
provide executives precisely what is needed for them to do their job well” (Gallo and Lewis
2012).
Recent social science work has begun to add theoretical and empirical examination of the
selection of ambassadorial types for specific posts. An initial study buttresses the conven-
tional wisdom by showing that political appointees typically receive postings in high-income,
high-tourism countries, and by developing an “implicit price list” for sought-after postings
82Personal interview, March 5, 2014.
83Ibid.
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in western European capitals such as London (Fedderke and Jett 2012). Hollibaugh (2013)
develops and then empirically tests a theory to explain presidential selection of ambassadors
by incorporating expectations of policy and patronage benefit along with a penalty in pol-
icy for less competent appointees; the analyses and results go beyond Fedderke and Jett’s
(2012) findings to suggest both domestic and foreign political factors that influence presiden-
tial choices. And although these two studies examine the selection phase for ambassadors,
neither the expansive literature on Senate confirmation of appointees or the expanding per-
formance literature address what happens after the initial nomination of ambassadors.
These initial empirical studies of ambassadorial selection, along with the broad descrip-
tive literature and active debate on selection and performance, highlight how little we know
about these appointments even though they are highly visible in policy and political debates.
As Hollibaugh (2013) articulates, but much of the general commentary glosses over, there is
significant variation between careerists and appointees both within individual ambassador-
ships and across the class as a whole. Yet we do not have systematic data on variation
within these types; for example, how many political appointees—or, perhaps more interest-
ingly, careerists—have language skills or experience in the countries to which they are sent?
What, if any, are the differences in the tasks they perform or the embassies they lead? And,
recognizing that not all political appointees perform poorly and not all careerists perform
well, are there systematic differences, on average, in performance either between or within
types of ambassadors?
3.2 Ambassadorial Advantages for a New Approach
to Appointments and Performance
Answering some of these questions about ambassadors could also offer explanations for some
of the broader issues yet unanswered in the bureaucratic performance literature. Perhaps for
no other appointed position has the tension between presidents’ constitutional prerogative of
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appointments and then-professor Woodrow Wilson’s ideal of a complete separation of poli-
tics from administration remained so palpable and unresolved as it has for ambassadorships.
Though generally not a focus of study for bureaucratic politics scholars, ambassadorships
offer historical, institutional, and methodological advantages for understanding the effect of
presidential personnel choices on bureaucratic performance at both the individual and pro-
gram or agency level. First, ambassadors are an important class of appointments in their own
right, as they are prominent, and often controversial, in policy and political debates. Am-
bassadorships are also located in comparable bureaucratic contexts managed by appointees
and careerists, providing important variation for understanding factors that influence bu-
reaucratic performance. And there are available performance measures that are comparable
across contexts and thus mitigate limitations of earlier measures. Following some histori-
cal background on ambassadorships and appointments, I describe the institutional context
within which ambassadors work, the expectations for why career diplomats could perform
better than political appointees in ambassadorships, and how the State Department’s process
for assessing ambassadorial and embassy performance could yield important new measures
of appointee and agency performance.
Ambassadorial Appointments from the Founding to the Present
Throughout our nation’s history, ambassadorships have exemplified the debate about presi-
dential choice and government performance. Ambassadors, or ministers and envoys as they
were primarily called until the 1890s, played a key role in American independence by ne-
gotiating France’s entry into the Revolutionary War and securing lines of credit to finance
the war efforts. The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution both explicitly autho-
rized the sending and receiving of ambassadors as a core function of government’s foreign
affairs responsibilities; and the Department of State (originally Foreign Affairs) was the first
cabinet department established. Despite such historical and institutional importance in the
early Republic, ambassadorships quickly became seen in the public eye as the embodiment
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of the spoils system rather than as essential positions for conducting foreign policy.84 And it
was contention over an ambassadorship that led to President Garfield’s assassination in 1881
and the subsequent passage of the Pendleton Act: Garfield’s assassin, Charles Guiteau, had
wanted to be appointed either as ambassador to Vienna or consul general to Paris (Peskin
1977).
Like in other agencies, the civil service reforms affecting the State Department began after
the Pendleton Act of 1883 and centered on concerns about recruitment, retention, patronage,
and performance. While serving in the U.S. legation to Russia in the late 1890s, Herbert
Peirce—a Harvard graduate, son-in-law of a senator, and career diplomat—had eloquently
argued for this professionalization of diplomacy:
As we would not put a ship into the hands of a commander ignorant of navigation,
an army under the control of a general without military training, a suit at law into
the hands of a counsel who never opened a law book, a suffering wife and child
under the care of a person wholly unskilled in medicine; so we should not put the
foreign affairs of our government into the hands of men without knowledge of the
various subjects which go to make up diplomatic science and consular efficiency
(1897, 919).
Peirce’s argument reflected the milieu of progressive civil service reform at the end of the
19th century, which focused on the problems of appointed, rather than careerist, leadership
in government agencies. Speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives just over a
decade later, congressman Frank Lowden of Illinois voiced his concerns about the long-term
challenge of recruiting talented diplomats when the top posts seemed permanently off-limits,
arguing that, “it ought to be possible for the lowest man in the foreign service to feel that
it is within his power, if his service justifies it, to reach the highest posts” (“Rise to World
Power, 1867-1913” n.d.).
84In a report to President Andrew Jackson, forwarded to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Secretary of State Edward Livingston wrote in 1833 that “ministers [ambassadors] are considered as
favorites, selected to enjoy the pleasures of foreign travel at the expense of the people; their places as
sinecures; and their residence abroad as a continued scene of luxurious enjoyment” (Message from the
President of the United States, 1833).
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Responding to such arguments, Presidents Grover Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt
issued executive orders that required entrance examinations and merit-based promotion for
consuls and diplomats; further legislation in 1906 established a grade classification for con-
sular officials and an inspection system of consular operations overseas (“Rise to World
Power, 1867-1913” n.d.). Then in 1924 the passage of the Rogers Act created the Foreign
Service. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 explicitly focused on the influence of campaign
donations on ambassadorial selection, asserting that ambassadorial appointments “should
normally be accorded to career members of the [Foreign] Service . . . ” and that “contribu-
tions to political campaigns should not be a factor” in such appointments (§304, 1980).
But extensive legislative reforms, the occasional journalistic piece on the price of am-
bassadorships,85 and constant complaints from retired careerists and the American Foreign
Service Association have not deterred presidents (or potential ambassadors). Since passage
of the Foreign Service Act, approximately 74% of ambassadors to countries in the G8 eco-
nomic group and approximately 54% of those assigned to G20 member nations have been
non-career appointees (American Foreign Service Association 2013). For the past 50 years,
presidents have generally given about 30% of all ambassadorships to political appointees.
Institutional Features of Ambassadorships and Embassies
Though frequently in the news during the presidential nomination and Senate confirmation
process, ambassadorships and embassies are often forgotten by the public and even political
leaders until a problem or scandal occurs. Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at the time, often groused about ambassadors: “Nothing is going to
pot because an ambassador’s not there. I’ve seen them come and I’ve seen them go and the
85One recent example on the front page of the New York Times (January 19, 2013), “Well-Trod Path:
Political Donor to Ambassador,” by Nicholas Confessore and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, highlighted the
rumors that the editor of Vogue magazine, a prodigious political fundraiser, wanted the ambassadorship
in London.
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best thing about almost all of them is when they go.”86 In spite of the seemingly unique
circumstances that keep ambassadors out of the limelight once confirmed, ambassadorships
and embassies are, in important ways, similar in function and institutional form to many
other executive branch roles and offices that consistently garner headlines. Both in personnel
and organization, embassies look like other bureaus and agencies. They have multiple layers
of authority, sometimes without clear demarcation of jurisdiction or boundaries; there are
personnel hired through multiple channels, with differing career tracks, benefits, and corre-
sponding incentives. Figure 3.1 shows the organizational layout of a typical medium-sized
embassy, such as the embassy in Accra, Ghana. This embassy employs over 500 people and
has an operating budget of approximately $150 million.87 Figure 3.2 focuses on the positions
and staffing of just the Department of State component of an embassy.
Figure 3.1: Embassy Organization
All ambassadorships require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation,88 with
the stature and legitimacy that this authority commands both within and without the bu-
reaucracy. Once confirmed by the Senate and at post, ambassadors typically serve terms
86Sciolino, Elaine. 1995. “Awaiting Call, Helms Puts Foreign Policy on Hold.” New York Times,
September 24, 1995. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/24/world/awaiting-call-helms-puts-
foreign-policy-on-hold.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (January 27, 2014).
87Figures as of March 2009; see Report of Inspection: Embassy Accra, Ghana, Report Number
ISP-I-09-14A, March 2009. http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/126064.pdf (January
27, 2014).
88Unlike most presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed sub-cabinet positions, however, the
requirement for Senate confirmation of ambassadors is constitutional (Article II, Section 2) rather than
statutory.
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Figure 3.2: Department of State Personnel in an Embassy
of limited duration (generally three years); and in these positions, they head organizational
units with a broad range of personnel and cross-cutting missions. Ambassadors, under “chief
of mission authority” conferred by various statutes and national security decision directives
(NSDDs), have some discretion over the allocation of personnel and resources at embassies.89
They do not have, however, much control over broader budgetary allocations or hiring and
firing decisions; both American officers and local staff are selected and separated from service
through extensive formal procedures subject to civil service and other labor laws. Although
these limitations provide ambassadors with little formal control, they still exercise informal
influence through tasking decisions, annual evaluations, and, especially for career ambas-
sadors, developing prote´ge´s among the mid- and entry-level officers.
Like many other bureaus or agencies with few appointees, the structure of embassy man-
agement means that the ambassador, regardless of professional background, works closely
with a careerist deputy; in this case, that position is the deputy chief of mission (DCM). There
is a traditional division of labor between ambassadors, who focus on external relationships
89For staffing, see for example the NSDD-38 process (http://www.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/) that allows
ambassadors limited control over interagency staffing at embassies. For funding, one prominent example
is the Ambassador’s Special Self-Help Fund program at embassies in sub-Saharan Africa
(http://www.state.gov/p/af/pdpa/ssh/index.htm).
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and public engagement, and DCMs, whose emphasis is on internal embassy management.
When an ambassador is absent from post for any reason, the DCM becomes the charge´
d’affaires and can act, in most important respects, with the legal authority of the ambas-
sador. This two-person team, along with their office management specialists, is called the
embassy’s Front Office.
Regardless of who occupies the White House or the foreign policy directives that come
from political principals, all ambassadors perform many tasks that do not change. As the of-
ficial representatives of the United States in their assigned countries, ambassadors engage in
public and private advocacy for U.S. policies and priorities, public outreach with media and
other audiences, and providing information to higher-level policymakers in Washington. As
chiefs of mission, they are ultimately responsible for leadership of all personnel at their posts
and for stewardship of embassy resources. They have to coordinate with other embassies in
the region, various bureaus within the State Department, and other executive branch agen-
cies. Office and bureau chiefs throughout the executive branch have similar responsibilities
even if the substantive policy areas differ. Thus because of the functional and institutional
similarities of ambassadorships and embassies described above, studying these positions can
lead to explanations of performance variation that are generalizable to other positions and
organizations in the executive branch.
To answer the question of whether careerists perform better than appointees, an impor-
tant characteristic of ambassadorships is that there is variation both across and within types
of ambassadors. The predominant view of career diplomats and political appointees is ex-
emplified by a comparison between the accomplishments of career diplomat Ryan Crocker,
ambassador to multiple Middle Eastern countries and a recipient of the Presidential Medal
of Freedom, and the tragicomic attempt of Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich to parlay his
authority to fill President Obama’s vacated Senate seat into his own appointment as an
ambassador. This dichotomy provides variation across type for an initial evaluation of per-
formance.
98
There are also observable distinctions within these two broad categories that are im-
portant to presidents and could influence performance. Four of President Obama’s earliest
ambassadorial nominees and one of President Bush’s appointees illustrate these distinc-
tions in background characteristics. Obama’s formal nominations of Jeffrey Bleich, Leslie
Rowe, and Cynthia Stroum arrived in the Senate on September 15, 2009. Both Bleich and
Stroum had provided significant financial support to President Obama’s campaign as well
as bundling campaign contributions from other donors; but unlike Stroum, Bleich had some
government and foreign policy experience to go along with his financial clout. At the time of
his nomination, he was Special Counsel to the President and had worked as an advisor in the
Clinton administration. Stroum’s ambassadorial posting would be Luxembourg and Bleich
would go down under to Canberra, Australia. By contrast, neither Rowe—a career foreign
service officer—nor any of her immediate relatives had ever given money to any political
candidates or parties. Rowe had already served as ambassador in one tough location, Papua
New Guinea, and was nominated for the head job in Mozambique. She spoke the language
(Portuguese) and had previous high-level diplomatic experience in East Africa.
Nominated as ambassador to China two months earlier than Rowe, Bleich, and Stroum,
former Utah governor and future unsuccessful presidential candidate Jon Huntsman was
not a stereotypical political appointee. Whether or not President Obama’s appointment of
Huntsman was designed to deter a political rival ahead of the 2012 presidential election,
Huntsman was highly qualified: he speaks fluent Mandarin and had worked extensively on
the U.S.-China relationship as an appointee in previous presidential administrations.90 And
Kurt Volker, a career diplomat whom President Bush designated as U.S ambassador to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had political connections, having served as a State De-
partment legislative fellow on Senator John McCain’s staff in the late 1990s. While Stroum
and Rowe represent the prototypical donor-turned-appointee versus apolitical careerist di-
90U.S. Embassy Beijing biography, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/ambassador09.html (May
14, 2014).
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chotomy, the appointments of Huntsman and Volker highlight how some political appointees
possess characteristics typically associated with substantive competence and some careerists
have political experience to accompany their substantive expertise.
Expectations for Performance by Appointees and Careerists
Given this institutional and historical context, political appointees filling ambassadorships
appear to be at a severe disadvantage in comparison to career diplomats. The analogy be-
tween diplomacy and medicine, law, and military leadership articulated by Herbert Peirce
above succinctly describes the perception that expertise and neutral competence are ir-
replaceable in such a complex environment as foreign policy and national security. Such
expertise could include experience managing personnel and resources within the constraints
of a public bureaucracy (Heclo 1977). Another element of ambassadorial competence is the
ability to negotiate intra- and interagency relationships; at many embassies, for example,
the State Department contingent represents only 30 percent of the entire embassy com-
munity nominally under chief of mission authority, with the other 70 percent coming from
other agencies (Kennan 1997). Career diplomats could also benefit from the leadership and
managerial training, tailored specifically for the Foreign Service context, that was instituted
under Secretary of State Colin Powell and required for promotion to senior levels of the
Foreign Service (Foreign Affairs Council 2003).
When Congress formally expressed a preference for career diplomats as ambassadors over
political appointees in the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the act also listed key qualifications
that potential ambassadorial appointees—career or otherwise—should possess in order to
successfully lead an embassy. These included “a useful knowledge of the principal language
or dialect of the country in which the individual is to serve, and knowledge and understanding
of the history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests of that
country and its people” (§304, 1980). Campaign donors and political supporters, lacking such
skills and knowledge, could be ill-equipped to develop rapport with foreign leaders, handle
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aggressive or adversarial media interlocutors, and analyze local political developments. And
even political appointees with language skills or in-depth experience in a country might
perform worse than careerists because they do not understand State Department norms,
culture, or procedure as well; in essence, they lack the unique capacities or knowledge relating
to public management that is not transferable from other domains (Lewis 2007).
Based on the prevalent approach to performance and specific expectations for ambas-
sadorial performance, two primary hypotheses focus on the distinction between careerists
and political appointees:
H1: Career diplomats perform better than political appointees as ambassadors.
H2: Embassies led by career diplomats perform better than embassies led by political
appointees.
Auxiliary hypotheses can illustrate the differences in performance based on characteristics
of the individual appointees rather than the type of appointee:
H3: Ambassadors with previous regional or language experience (per the Foreign Service
Act of 1980) perform better than ambassadors without such qualifications.
Measuring Ambassadorial and Embassy Performance
In addition to the historical background and institutional features of U.S. embassies, there
is a long tradition in the State Department of internal performance assessment that could
provide a way to adjudicate between these competing expectations. Since 1906, Congress
has statutorily mandated assessments of operations at U.S. embassies and consulates abroad;
the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required biennial “inspections” of the management of every
operating unit of the State Department (GAO 1983). The statutory inspectors general es-
tablished under the 1978 Inspector General Act in most cabinet departments were expected
to leave regular management assessments to existing management bureaus while exercis-
ing discretion in the reviews and investigations they chose to conduct as problems arose
(§6(a)(2), 1978). State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) likewise investigates allegations
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of fraud and abuse and performs formal audits according to broadly accepted standards.
But, uniquely among cabinet departments, State’s OIG conducts general management as-
sessments or inspections of operating units based on a statutory mandate (GAO 1983); the
Foreign Service Act of 1980 sets a specific timetable (every five years)91 and substantive cat-
egories for evaluation (§209). This mandate results in State’s OIG using inspections rather
than more formalized audits as a much higher proportion of its oversight activities than other
agencies do. In fiscal year 2005, for example, State’s OIG released 99 inspection reports and
just 44 audit reports. By comparison, the combined output from inspectors general subject
to the 1978 Inspector General Act had just 443 inspection reports but over 4,300 audit re-
ports (GAO 2007). These requirements remove both the selection effects inherent to other
inspector general investigations of which units get reviewed and when those investigations
occur as well as making inspection results comparable across operating units and over time.
This institutionalized tradition of performance evaluation and its standardized format
provide a potential new source of performance data that could add to the performance re-
search that has relied on PART scores and survey responses for measures of performance.
Because any “comparative study of executive performance” should provide for the “identifi-
cation of the universe of federal bureau chiefs” and “adequately distinguish appointees from
careerists” (Lewis 2007), the extensive historical record makes it possible to identify the uni-
verse of ambassadors either cross-sectionally or dynamically and clearly distinguish between
appointees and careerists. And by focusing on positions within the same executive depart-
ment and with uniform position titles, statutory authority, confirmation requirements, and
91Congress has repeatedly waived this five-year requirement since enactment of the Foreign Service Act; in
spite of the waiver, OIG has generally kept within a year or two of the five year prescription based on
funding and other priorities, including other congressionally requested investigations or inspections of
specific programs. State’s OIG does incorporate risk-based prioritization in its inspections; for embassy
inspections, however, this is not used to determine which embassies to schedule for inspection. Rather,
the risk-based prioritization puts emphasis on certain operational areas at every embassy inspected, such
as information technology and security capabilities. Some inspections of other operating units or
programs are scheduled based on risks, such as contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan or operations of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (see e.g. inspection report ISP-IB-13-50 on U.S. broadcasting to
Russia, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/217908.pdf).
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performance mandates for political appointees and career diplomats alike, there is minimal
variation in the broader departmental culture or position authority across positions. But
there is variation in some key institutional features—such as embassy size and location—that
are of interest for comparing the personal and sub-departmental institutional characteristics
that influence performance.
3.3 Data, Measures, and Methods
To evaluate ambassadorial and embassy performance, I analyze data compiled from 197 in-
spection reports released by the State Department’s OIG between 2002 and 2013 and posted
to their online report archive.92 The Foreign Service Act (FSA) of 1980 specifies that these
inspections should determine “whether policy goals and objectives are being achieved and
whether the interests of the United States are being represented and advanced effectively”
(§209, 1980). OIG inspection teams meet with department officials in the Washington ge-
ographic bureaus with responsibility for each inspected embassy and then travel to the
embassy to conduct interviews, collect survey data from embassy employees, and observe
embassy operations. The reports documenting these inspections, obtained from OIG’s web-
site and through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, are thus a rich source of data
for empirically determining if careerists perform better than appointees at the individual
level and if embassies led by careerists outperform embassies headed by appointees.
Each OIG inspection examines the following statutorily designated areas of performance
at embassies: Policy Implementation, Resource Management, and Management Controls.
For Policy Implementation, the OIG inspection teams evaluate “whether policy goals and
objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and
effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately
92There are 208 reports in the dataset, but there are 11 reports from embassies at which there was no
full-time Chief of Mission evaluated by the OIG team. In these cases, the OIG teams evaluated the
Deputy Chief of Mission in the role of charge´ d’affaires or acting ambassador.
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coordinated.”93 The teams also conduct more technical and formulaic assessments more
similar to official audits of Resource Management and Management Controls, as these areas
involve more complex statutory and regulatory guidelines for expending funds, operating
and maintaining government-owned buildings and vehicles, and managing both American
and third-country national staffing.
In this paper, I focus on the Policy Implementation aspect of the inspections because it is
the area in which ambassadors have the most discretion and around which the debate about
careerist versus appointee leadership revolves. Inspectors look at the traditional diplomatic
functions of an ambassador, such as how well the ambassador conveys U.S. priorities and
positions to the host country government, the flow of information from the embassy to
key audiences in Washington, and the ambassador’s public activities and media relations.
They also assess the ambassador’s internal leadership and management in the embassy: the
critical relationship between the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission, the level of
coordination between different agencies represented in the embassy, mentoring and guidance
of entry-level officers, and management of the local staff.
Following the inspection, OIG prepares a report summarizing the results of the inspec-
tion. Each inspection report is divided into six main sections: 1) Key Judgments, which
summarizes the major achievements and areas of concern identified by the inspectors; 2)
Context, which provides an overview of U.S. interests and relations with the host country;
3) Executive Direction, which focuses on ambassadorial leadership and front office guidance
of the mission; 4) Policy and Program Implementation, which evaluates the activities and
programs of the political, economic, public affairs, and consular section of the embassy; 5)
Resource Management, which assesses human resources, financial management, and facilities
maintenance operations; and 6) Recommendations, which includes specific tasks for embassy
and State Department action. In this paper, I draw primarily on the Key Judgments and
93From the report’s section on “Purpose, Scope and Methodology of the Inspection,” typically included
after the cover sheet. See e.g. Inspection Report Number ISP-I-09-30A from Embassy Baghdad,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/126600.pdf (February 1, 2014).
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Executive Direction sections for evaluations of ambassadorial performance and on the Policy
and Program Implementation section for assessments of broader embassy performance.
The inspections’ frequency and uniform assessment criteria, prescribed by statute (FSA
§209, 1980), provide for within-case comparison of appointees and careerists, and cross-case
analysis of ambassadors and embassies. Because the OIG inspections are not undertaken
as a response to problems, but are instead scheduled at relatively consistent intervals, there
is not a selection effect of including only poor or excellent embassies or political or career
ambassadors in the data. There are also embassies (Buenos Aires, Kabul, Nairobi, Phnom
Penh) in the dataset with a political ambassador at the time of one inspection and a ca-
reer diplomat in the top position during another inspection; these cases could help address
concerns about endogeneity, or whether some factors omitted from the analysis might pre-
dict both what type of ambassador, political or career, is selected and how the ambassador
performs.
Unlike surveys or other opt-in research methods, these inspections do not depend on the
“willingness on the part of federal executives to participate” (Lewis 2007). Additionally,
because the Foreign Service Act of 1980 designated the areas for evaluation, the assessments
are, at least in principle, fairly consistent across reports and over time. This externally
prescribed framework for evaluating performance provides an “acceptable definition of good
performance” and an “acceptable grading scheme” (Lewis 2007), both critical components
of valid comparisons of executive performance.
Measuring Ambassadorial and Embassy Performance
The current dataset includes multiple measures of ambassadorial and embassy performance
drawn from the OIG inspection reports.94 For measures of general performance, I extract
94I have also requested via the Freedom of Information Act the surveys that the OIG teams administer to
embassy employees during the inspections; that request is currently under appeal. These surveys include
specific questions about ambassadorial leadership, employee morale, internal customer service between
embassy sections, internal financial controls, and the allocation of resources. The responses contribute to
and are cited in the published reports. The surveys could add quantitative measures of how embassy
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Table 3.1: Sentences Referencing & Evaluating Embassy Leadership
Sentence Subject Informational Positive Negative Total Sentences
Ambassador alone 798 1490 252 2540
DCM alone 372 695 104 1171
Combined 571 1358 241 2170
Total 1741 3543 597 5881
All sentences in Key Judgments and Executive Direction sections of OIG reports
that reference the ambassador, deputy chief of mission (DCM), or both.
from the Key Judgments and Executive Direction sections every sentence that mentions the
ambassador, deputy chief of mission, or both.95 There are 5,881 sentences, with an average
of 29.9 sentences per report. After coding the leader referenced in the sentence (ambassador,
DCM, or both) and whether these sentences are merely informational (1,741) or include an
evaluative judgment of performance (4,140) from the OIG inspectors, I code each evaluative
sentence for a negative or positive evaluation (0,1; 85.6%) (see Table 3.1 below). From
these evaluative sentences, I create a performance score (0-1, 0.77) for each ambassador by
calculating the proportion of positive to negative evaluative sentences.96
An informational sentence could explain background characteristics of an ambassador
or describe objective features of an ambassador’s work or schedule without discussing or
evaluating performance. Many informational sentences include references to when an am-
bassador arrived at post and what previous experience the ambassador had in the country or
region: “The Ambassador, who arrived in December 2011, acquired expertise about South
Sudanese politics and society from her participation in the negotiation of the 2005 Com-
employees—both American diplomats and local staff—perceive ambassadorial performance relative to the
external assessments of the OIG inspection teams.
95In embassy parlance, the combined executive leadership team of the ambassador and DCM are referred
to by various phrases: “front office,” “executive team,” “executive direction,” “post management,”
“executive leadership,” etc. Sentences with such phrases are included in the dataset and are coded as
references to both the ambassador and DCM.
96I also calculate performance scores for each DCM, but do not include these scores in the analysis as they
are not a primary focus of this paper.
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prehensive Peace Agreement with Sudan.”97 The following two sentences, from inspections
of embassies in Pretoria, South Africa, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, both include a pos-
itive evaluation of performance while referencing the ambassador alone or the front office
(ambassador and DCM) collectively: “The Ambassador provides strong leadership to this
large mission;”98 and “Senior officials in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)
identify the embassy front office as one of the strongest teams in the region.”99 An exam-
ple of a negative evaluation is: “The main operational problem at Embassy Sarajevo is an
exaggerated concentration of decision-making and paperwork in the front office.”100
I also derive two other measures of performance to examine more detailed hypotheses
about ambassadorial leadership of other elements of the embassy: executive team facilitation
of interagency coordination and the level of political and economic reporting quality. I
focus on interagency coordination because it is one of the few responsibilities of the chief
of mission that are specifically articulated in the Foreign Service Act: “under the direction
of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for
the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees
in that country” (FSA, §207(a)(1)). And consequently, it is one of the main emphases of
the OIG inspections, as inspectors evaluate “whether all elements of an office or mission are
being adequately coordinated.”101 A possible mechanism for a performance advantage for
career diplomats over political appointees is an understanding of interagency relationships
developed through public management experience. The measure of interagency coordination
(1-3, low, medium, high) can provide leverage for evaluating if this mechanism is at play.
97From the 2013 inspection report on Embassy Juba, report number I-13-29A,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/211153.pdf (February 1, 2014).
98From the 2011 inspection report on Embassy Pretoria, report number I-11-42A,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/169232.pdf (February 1, 2014).
99From the 2013 inspection report on Embassy Buenos Aires, report number I-13-15A,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/206821.pdf (February 1, 2014).
100From the 2009 report on Embassy Sarajevo, report number I-09-55A,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/132896.pdf (February 1, 2014).
101From the report’s section on “Purpose, Scope and Methodology of the Inspection,” typically included
after the cover sheet. See e.g. Inspection Report Number ISP-I-09-30A from Embassy Baghdad,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/126600.pdf (February 1, 2014).
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The report on Embassy Bucharest in 2012 provides an example of poor interagency
coordination, coded as a ‘1’ in the dataset: “Many employees described the mission to the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) team as ‘territorial’ or stovepiped.”102 The following
sentence exemplifies what would be coded as a ‘2’ for mixed performance: “Interagency
relations, while professional and productive, would benefit from greater transparency and
inclusiveness on the part of post management.”103 An outstanding evaluation of interagency
cooperation comes from the report on Embassy Buenos Aires in 2006: “This front office
team has fostered excellent interagency cooperation and has orchestrated impressive law
enforcement and security cooperation with Argentine authorities.”104
The measure of political and economic reporting quality (1-3, low, medium, high) reflects
the debate about how much effect managers, either political appointees or careerists, can
have on civil servants in the hierarchy below leadership. Whether the latest trend in U.S.
diplomatic efforts is a focus on digital outreach or empowering civil society organizations, the
core diplomatic function of embassies is the gathering of information and reporting back to
policymakers in Washington. Political and economic reporting quality is thus a feasible proxy
for embassy performance, and could indicate whether ambassadorial type or characteristics
are factors in how other officials respond to leadership.105 While the OIG reports also discuss
other broad areas of embassy performance, such as resource management, reporting quality is
a more suitable measure because it reflects the output primarily of American foreign service
officers in the political and economic sections rather than local staffers in human resources,
financial management, or facilities maintenance.
102From the 2012 report on Embassy Bucharest,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/197277.pdf (February 1, 2014).
103From the 2008 report on Embassy Dublin,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/120259.pdf (February 1, 2014).
104From the 2006 report on Embassy Buenos Aires,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/136032.pdf (February 1, 2014).
105Inspection teams also examine consular section efficiency and customer service, the integration and
execution of public diplomacy, and resource management metrics in financial accounting, internal
controls, and staffing issues. Any of these evaluations could also serve as proxies for overall embassy
performance.
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Comments from inspectors about reporting such as, “. . . such messages often lack the
insight and analysis that are the hallmark of Foreign Service reporting,”106 are coded as a ‘1.’
Positive evaluations with caveats or qualifications are coded as ‘2’ in the data: “Reporting
on Brazil’s internal politics and foreign policy is strong, but some required work is not being
done.”107 Much of the evaluation of reporting comes from OIG inspectors’ discussions with
Washington recipients; for example, Embassy Banjul reporting officers received favorable
reviews from their audience: “Washington readers interested in The Gambia give Embassy
Banjul reporting and analysis generally high marks in terms of both quality and quantity.”108
Though the inspections also evaluate resource management and management controls,
measures of performance in these areas are likely to be less central to ambassadorial per-
formance. There are more prescriptive regulations for procurement, personnel hiring or
firing, accounting standards, and property management than for handling interagency con-
flicts or reporting critical political developments to Washington in written format. With
less apparent discretion and limited time to influence the more logistical aspects of embassy
performance—along with the traditional delegation of such responsibilities to the deputy
chief of mission—ambassadors are unlikely to expend significant time or effort on these areas
of performance, making them less central to a broader analysis of ambassadorial performance.
Key Factors for Performance
For measures of individual- and embassy-level factors that might influence performance, I
draw on the criteria most often cited in journalistic and political commentary about ambas-
sadorial qualifications. The primary distinction made is that between career diplomats and
political appointees (0,1; 30.8%); these are coded based on the State Department’s historical
106From the 2010 report on Embassy Dhaka,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/149413.pdf (February 1, 2014).
107From the 2008 report on Embassy Brasilia,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/113914.pdf (February 1, 2014).
108From 2009 report on Embassy Banjul, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/126066.pdf
(February 1, 2014).
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Table 3.2: Ambassadorial Performance Scores by Type
Ambassador Type Reports Average Score Min/Max Std. Dev
Career Diplomats 133 0.79 .2/1 0.17
Political Appointees 64 0.73 .1/1 0.20
All reports 197 0.77 .1/1 0.18
Score is proportion of positive evaluations from all evaluative sentences.
listing of ambassadors and the congressional records of nominations. For countries where
no fully accredited ambassador is assigned because of a diplomatic dispute, such as Burma,
or where there is a consulate inspected independently of an embassy, such as Hong Kong or
Hamilton, Bermuda, I include the chiefs of these missions as ambassadors. A deputy chief
of mission temporarily serving as charge´ d’affaires, i.e. as the acting or interim ambassador
while awaiting a Senate-confirmed ambassador, is coded only as a deputy chief of mission
(5.3%).
An initial look at the performance scores derived from evaluative sentences conforms to
the expectation of poorer performance by political appointees, as the mean performance
score for political appointees is lower than for career diplomats (see Table 3.2 below).
When Congress formally expressed a preference for career diplomats as ambassadors over
political appointees in the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the act also listed key qualifications
that potential ambassadorial appointees—career or otherwise—should possess. These in-
cluded “a useful knowledge of the principal language or dialect of the country in which the
individual is to serve, and knowledge and understanding of the history, the culture, the
economic and political institutions, and the interests of that country and its people” (§304,
1980). To measure language skills (0,1; 67.5%),109 and regional experience (0,1; 71.1%), I
109Because of the imprecision of these biographies relating to the level of language skill, I have also
requested language skill records via the FOIA process; the Foreign Service Act of 1980 requires the State
Department to provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with information on ambassadorial
language skills once they have been at post for six months. This FOIA request is currently pending.
Additionally, several recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports highlight the
shortcomings of the State Department’s language training program. For example, a 2008 GAO report
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use official State Department biographies, available either on the Department’s website or,
in more recent cases, on the embassy’s website. If the biography expressly states that an
ambassador speaks the language of the country or describes prior experience in positions that
would have required language skills, I code language skills as a ‘1.’ In some cases, the OIG
reports also directly comment on language proficiency or prior regional experience. I also
code language skills (0,1; 80.9%) and regional experience (0,1; 86.3%) for deputy chiefs of
mission; but because fewer DCMs have biographical information on the State Department’s
website, I used general web searches to find other sources, including LinkedIn career histo-
ries or newspaper articles referencing their experience or language skills.110 Table 3.3 below
indicates the distribution of these background characteristics among political appointees and
career diplomats.
Table 3.3 also includes institutional factors that could affect performance. State Depart-
ment statistics and the OIG reports provide measures for location, operating environment,
and size. I identify location based on the State Department’s division of six regional bureaus
(African Affairs (AF), covering sub-Saharan Africa; East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP);
European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR); Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), covering the Middle
East and North Africa; South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), covering the Indian subcon-
tinent and central Asia; and Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)). This measure of location
could highlight one institutional mechanism that influences performance. If different bureaus
within the State Department are better or worse at assigning and supporting ambassadors,
noted that almost 1/3 of Foreign Service officers in overseas positions that are designated for qualified
speakers of the local language did not have the required proficiency
(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09955.pdf). These reports, along with personal experience that
contributes to some skepticism about the State Department’s evaluation of language proficiency, suggest
that my measure of language skill likely overstates how many career diplomats speak the language of the
country to which they are assigned as ambassadors.
110I also code an indicator variable for whether or not English is either an official or predominant language
in the country; I use the CIA’s World Factbook language listing
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2098.html) for the
coding rule. In the analyses below, the results are not statistically or substantively different if I include
this control variable or drop the observations for these countries in which ambassadors—either political
appointees or careerists—can easily conduct official business in English.
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Table 3.3: Ambassadorial and Embassy Characteristics
Career Diplomats Political Appointees Total
Personal Characteristics
Language Skills 102 31 133
(77.4%) (48.4%) (68.0%)
Regional Experience 114 26 140
(85.7%) (40.6%) (71.1%)
Embassy Characteristics
Total Employees 501 531 511
Hardship Differential (0-5) 23 41 64
(10-15) 30 10 40
(20-25) 59 11 70
(30-35) 21 2 23
Danger Pay (0-5) 109 62 171
(10-15) 12 0 12
(20-25) 9 1 10
(30-35) 3 1 4
Regional Bureau
Africa 44 5 49
East Asia Pacific 22 8 30
Europe 21 29 50
Near East 18 3 22
South Central Asia 10 3 13
Western Hemisphere 18 16 34
Total Employees excludes 2 reports which had all employee numbers redacted.
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performance could vary simply based on regional bureau effectiveness.
Related to location is the environment within which ambassadors lead embassies. Some
countries have well-developed political, social, and physical infrastructure that make life and
work much easier; others are less-developed and sometimes incredibly dangerous for civilian
workforces. The State Department and other agencies, based on the Overseas Differentials
and Allowances Act passed in 1960, compensate employees beyond their base salaries when
conditions are difficult. The two main allowances for difficult conditions are post hardship
differential and danger pay; these are distinct from cost-of-living allowances that are paid
to government employees abroad and domestically based on differences in basic expenses.
Post hardship differential (0-35) is the percentage added to basic compensation for “service
at places in foreign areas where conditions . . . differ substantially from conditions . . . in the
United States.”111 Such differences include availability of medical care, physical hardship, or
crime levels. Danger pay (0-35) is similarly a percentage of base salary in addition to regular
compensation for service in locations “where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions
threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. Government civilian employees.”112
Table 3.3 shows that political ambassadors, though predominantly nominated to posts in
western Europe, also serve in other geographic regions and in most levels of hardship and
danger pay posts.
Because the complexity of managing an organization could depend on the scale of the
organization, I measure embassy size as a proxy for such complexity. An ambassador in
Malabo, Equitorial Guinea, for example, is chief of mission for an embassy staffed by 2 other
State Department officers and 16 local employees. By contrast, the ambassador in Beijing or
Bangkok confronts the task of leading over 500 American employees from multiple agencies
111See Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSR) section 510 for definition,
http://aoprals.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=260&menu_id=81; and the Office of Allowances
for historical rates, http://aoprals.state.gov/Web920/hardship.asp (January 28, 2014).
112See Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSR) section 651 for definition,
http://aoprals.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=271&menu_id=81; and the Office of Allowances
for historical rates, http://aoprals.state.gov/Web920/danger_pay_all.asp (January 28, 2014).
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and local staffs of over 1000. Embassy size (14-2319)113 is measured as the total number of
number of direct-hire American personnel (DHA) and locally employed staff (LES), which
includes host country nationals, U.S. citizens hired locally, and third-country nationals.
Methods
Because the ambassadorial scores are censored, I use tobit (or censored normal) regression
models as a more consistent estimator than ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the
effects of appointee type, ambassadorial characteristics, and institutional features on the
overall ambassadorial scores for each report. I also use robust standard errors because the
sentences used to compile the scores are not independent, violating the assumptions of both
OLS and tobit regression.114 I then estimate ordered logistic regression models to analyze
the influence of ambassadorial and embassy characteristics on interagency coordination and
113Embassy Baghdad’s total employment does not include over 10,000 contractors (approximately 13,500
at the time of the 2009 inspection report and just below 11,500 at the time of the 2013 report) providing
security, construction, and other services. For other embassies employing contractors, I also excluded
these counts; the total number in Baghdad simply far outstrips the level of contracting at other
embassies. And even without the contractors in the total count, Embassy Baghdad employs more
direct-hire Americans than any other embassy.
114There are several other potential weaknesses in using data from the reports. Because inspection teams
consist of career civil and foreign service officers, there could be bias in the reports based on personal
connections or experience. Because Foreign Service personnel in OIG rotate out to new assignments,
inspection team composition changes slightly each year—and early reports in the dataset include the
names of inspection team members, allowing for appropriate coding of reports by inspection team. For
later years in the dataset, however, the names of the inspectors are redacted from the reports.
Regarding this potential bias, the Government Accountability Office has repeatedly found that there are
both “structural independence issues” and a “lack of assurance that the department obtains
independent [inspector general] investigations” because of the role of current foreign service officers on
the inspection teams (GAO 2007). To control for changing inspection team competition, I also estimate
the models with controls for year of inspection; the results are similar substantively and statistically,
with only reports in 2011 showing a statistically significant decline in scores. This decline is likely due to
two highly negative reports for political appointees in Luxembourg and Valletta, Malta; both of these
ambassadors resigned after the reports were released to the public.
Related to potential biases of the inspection teams, the level of redacted material in reports is another
possible source of error. As commentators have noted, four recent reports, all about embassies led by
political appointees, contained few redactions compared to other reports of struggling embassies led by
career diplomats. See “State Dept OIG Reports: Oh, Redactions, Is Double-Standard Thy True Name?”
Diplopundit.net. http://diplopundit.net/2012/07/19/state-dept-oig-reports-oh-redactions-
is-double-standard-thy-true-name/ (February 3, 2014).
Finally, several of the deputy chiefs of mission at embassies inspected early in the period were later
appointed ambassadors at embassies that were inspected later in the period; and eight ambassadors held
ambassadorships in different embassies during two separate inspections.
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reporting quality. The appendix includes logistic regression models examining the evaluative
sentences in each report, as well as OLS estimates of the ambassadorial scores as robustness
checks for the tobit models.
3.4 Results
To test the main hypothesis that career diplomats perform better as ambassadors than po-
litical appointees, I first estimate tobit regression models of the influence of different ambas-
sadorial and embassy characteristics on the proportion of positive evaluations by report. The
first model only includes the type, with model 2 including indicators for the ambassadors’
language skills and regional experience. Models 3 and 4 include embassy-level characteristics,
with model 4 also estimating the effects of a DCM’s characteristics on evaluations.
The results in Table 3.4 above suggest that politically appointed ambassadors perform
worse generally than career diplomats, with a 10% reduction in performance score on average
for political appointees compared to careerists. And though the estimates indicate a statis-
tically significant effect on performance from the living and working conditions as measured
by hardship differential, the substantive effect is minimal; and the size of an embassy has
no effect on ambassadorial performance. And, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, neither do
ambassadorial language skills nor regional experience—contrary to what the Foreign Service
Act of 1980 articulated as critical skills for any aspiring chief of mission.
An ambassador’s language ability does, however, appear related to facilitating intera-
gency coordination (see Table 3.5 below)—even as ambassadorial type and regional experi-
ence do not. The expectation was that career diplomats should be able to better manage
interagency relations because of their public management and agency-specific expertise. But
the estimates from these models, obtained by ordered logistic regression, show little difference
between careerists and appointees—possibly because one significant influence on interagency
coordination could be completely out of the ambassador’s control: the capacity and coopera-
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Table 3.4: Ambassadorial Performance Scores
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ambassador characteristics
Political Appointee -0.07* -0.06 -0.10* -0.09*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Language Skills 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Regional Experience 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Deputy Chief of Mission characteristics
Language Skills -0.01
(0.04)
Regional Experience -0.00
(0.04)
Embassy characteristics
Total Employees 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Hardship Differential 0.00 * -0.01 *
(0.00) (0.00)
Danger Pay 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.80* 0.79* 0.84* 0.86*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
N 197 197 195 163
Estimates from tobit regression, standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
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tion of agency heads assigned by their agencies in Washington. At the embassy in Beijing, for
example, competition for direction of economic policy simply reflects interagency squabbles
in Washington. At the embassy, there is no clear hierarchy based on seniority because “most
agencies are represented in Beijing by senior officers of equal rank.” The OIG inspectors
also noted that “[s]everal mission staff members characterize economic policy coordination
as ’Washington in Beijing.’ ”
The effect of language capacity on interagency coordination could stem from those polit-
ical appointees who combine language skill with an understanding of Washington political
realities to successfully direct coordinated efforts and resources to the most critical issues.
Both career diplomats and politically appointed ambassadors with language skills could also
benefit from higher trust and engagement with local audiences, giving them insights and in-
creased credibility when trying to coordinate agencies with differing interests and capacities.
These estimates, like those in Table 3.4, also demonstrate that a post’s level of hardship
matters, though the substantive effects on interagency coordination are small. Hardship
could be connected with the challenge of recruiting capable personnel, especially for agencies
such as the Treasury Department in which the agency’s primary mission is not normally
related to preparing for and performing in difficult overseas locations. If agencies cannot
send their most adaptable and capable personnel, poor interagency coordination could result
in large measure from the initial assignment of personnel rather than from poor embassy
leadership. Another reason why hardship differential could affect interagency coordination
is the challenge posed by underdeveloped infrastructure. Many embassies in less developed
countries have grown in size in a patchwork fashion, with new offices and buildings added
over time. In countries with poorly designed and maintained transportation and information
technology infrastructure, simply meeting face-to-face or coordinating between agencies in
different offices or locations can be extremely difficult.
Another hypothesis addresses the level of influence a chief of mission could have on
the performance of other sections further down in the embassy’s hierarchy. Estimates of
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Table 3.5: Ambassadorial Performance in Interagency Coordination
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ambassador characteristics
Political Appointee 0.11 0.14 -0.24 -0.68
(0.37) (0.43) (0.48) (0.54)
Language Skills 0.82* 0.83* 0.82
(0.39) (0.40) (0.54)
Regional Experience -0.54 -0.33 -0.26
(0.45) (0.46) (0.52)
Deputy Chief of Mission characteristics
Language Skills -0.24
(0.57)
Regional Experience 0.07
(0.58)
Embassy characteristics
Total Employees 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Hardship Differential -0.03 -0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
Danger Pay -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
τ1 -2.58 -2.55 -3.03 -3.76
(0.31) (0.55) (0.64) (0.91)
τ2 -1.17 -1.11 -1.59 -2.08
(0.21) (0.50) (0.59) (0.85)
N 191 191 189 161
Estimates from ordered logistic regression, standard errors
in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
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an embassy’s quality of political and economic reporting indicate that ambassadorial type
is significantly related to reporting quality (see Table 3.6 below)—but language skills and
regional experience are not. Without prior embassy experience, political appointees might
not know what the expectations are from Washington audiences for political and economic
reporting; and they might not provide in-depth oversight, either themselves or through the
DCM, of the political and economic sections that could improve reporting performance.
Table 3.6: Embassy Reporting Quality
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ambassador characteristics
Political Appointee -0.86* -0.76* -0.92* -1.06*
(0.32) (0.37) (0.41) (0.47)
Language Skills 0.57 0.67 0.39
(0.36) (0.37) (0.49)
Regional Experience -0.22 -0.03 0.07
(0.38) (0.40) (0.44)
Deputy Chief of Mission characteristics
Language Skills -0.34
(0.52)
Regional Experience 0.14
(0.51)
Includes Embassy-level Controls N N Y Y
τ1 -3.15 -3.03 -3.43 -4.06
(0.34) (0.52) (0.59) (0.86)
τ2 -0.97 -0.83 -1.13 -1.76
(0.19) (0.43) (0.50) (0.77)
N 193 193 191 162
Estimates from ordered logistic regression, standard errors in
parentheses. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
These findings provide an important starting point for further analysis, as they indicate
that there is empirical support for the perception that politically appointed ambassadors
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perform worse than career diplomats. Another implication of these findings is that the crite-
ria laid out in the Foreign Service Act do not necessarily address characteristics critical for
performance. In some cases, the State Department assigns career diplomats to ambassador-
ships for which they have neither regional nor language expertise; and both ambassadors
and DCMs without such qualifications perform well on measures of leadership and internal
management.
3.5 Conclusion
Though nominally chief executives of the executive branch and its more than 2 million federal
civilian employees and almost 1.5 million active-duty military personnel, modern presidents
directly control a much smaller organization of 3,000 to 4,000 presidential appointees. But
because this core group has immense influence on what executive branch agencies do, presi-
dents spend significant political capital and institutional effort to recruit, select, and direct
appointees. While presidents hope to reap electoral and other political benefits from patron-
age appointments, they also want political control of agencies and responsive performance
from appointees.
Along with the extensive historical and qualitative literature on appointments and ap-
pointee performance, scholars are developing deeper theoretical and empirical treatments of
presidential appointment decisions and consequent effects on aggregate bureaucratic perfor-
mance. Yet even as the literature has begun to explain what appointees do and how well
they do it at the program or agency level, there is no systematic assessment of the individual
appointment choices of presidents and performance at the individual appointee level.
This paper seeks to contribute to this part of the presidential literature by examining
appointments and performance at the individual level using new data on the effects of pres-
idential personnel choices on ambassadorial performance. The conventional wisdom—that
politically appointed ambassadors are detrimental to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and
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this transmission of information—has few, if any, critics. Yet there has not been any system-
atic examination to either endorse or refute the anecdotal claims of harm to our diplomatic
efforts. The results above suggest that the stark dichotomy of career diplomats and politi-
cal appointees explains some, but not all, of the differences in ambassadorial performance.
Appointee performance tended towards extremes: many political appointees received the
highest praise from inspectors, but a few were by far the worst performers. And while
careerists systematically performed better than appointees, there was significant variation
within careerists as well. Embassy size had little effect on performance, but higher hardship
differentials levels, reflecting challenging living and working conditions, were detrimental to
performance.
Related to these questions about the effects of ambassadorial and embassy characteristics
on performance is the need to identify the mechanisms through which leaders might affect
performance. Though challenging, finding ways to clearly demarcate the distinct individual
components of embassy performance could provide a better understanding of appointee/civil
service interactions and consequent effects on program or agency performance. Evaluating
the joint performance of the ambassador and DCM could begin to explain how much influence
a manager can have on the performance of subordinates and whether a mix of appointees and
careerists with specific characteristics is beneficial for performance (Lewis 2011). And could
there be a “coattails” effect for careerist ambassadors or other careerist agency leaders? Such
an effect would come from the possibility that career foreign service officers or civil servants
might exert more effort when led by career ambassadors who can have significant influence
over their career trajectories. This might be particularly relevant for foreign service officers,
who rotate assignments every 2-3 years. Impressing a high-ranking career ambassador could
lead to plum assignments, while failing to excel might consign that officer to less enticing
positions.
Further work focusing on ambassadors could refine our understanding of responsiveness in
both political and policy realms. For example, two prominent campaign donors in the 2008
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election cycle who received ambassadorial appointments from President Obama resigned
after State Department inspectors found significant problems at their embassies;115 both
subsequently raised significant funds for President Obamas reelection campaign and for other
congressional candidates. Their demonstrated foreign policy and managerial competence
was low, but, from a presidential perspective, was that performance less important than the
political benefit derived from their financial support in two elections?
And because many other agencies conduct similar inspections or audits, this data col-
lection method and the findings (for reasons explained above) are generalizable beyond the
embassy context and even beyond the American bureaucratic context. Canada similarly
evaluates its career diplomats and politically appointed ambassadors, and these performance
reviews are publicly available.116 With more such systematic evidence of how appointed and
career agency leaders can influence bureaucratic performance, presidents and other political
leaders could make better decisions—and be held more accountable when their decisions
damage agency performance.
115See State Department inspection reports from the Office of Inspector General, Report Number
ISP-I-11-17A, January 2011 and Report Number ISP-I-12-08A, January 2012.
116The Office of Inspector General for the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Development posts their inspection and evaluation reports online at
http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/index.aspx?lang=eng (February 3,
2014).
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APPENDIX A
Survival Estimates by Appointing President
Figure A.1: Survival Estimates for Visible/Invisible Appointments by President (Bush)
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Figure A.2: Survival Estimates for Visible/Invisible Appointments by President (Obama)
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APPENDIX B
Codebook for Appointee Resume Project
The data collection process began with the Lewis Lab team sending Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests to almost 100 government agencies in late May, 2011. These requests
sought to get the names and resumes of all political appointees from January 2001 to May
2011. 53 agencies responded to the requests, providing resumes for at least some of the
political appointees during the period of study.
To build the dataset, seven graduate students used the coding rules below to code infor-
mation on the appointees’ positions (from the federal Plum Book, the Federal Yellow Book
leadership directories, web searches and agency-provided lists) and backgrounds (only from
the resumes). As of August 10, 2012, the coding group had coded resumes for just over 3000
appointments.
The purpose of this dataset is to collect information on political appointees in differ-
ent presidential administrations. With a few exceptions the goal is to collect data on the
backgrounds of appointees prior to their work in the administration.
Variables:
Appointing President : The president that selected the appointee. This can usually be de-
termined by noting the years of service (i.e., 2001-2008 vs. 2009-present).
Last Name: The appointee’s last name.
First Name: The appointee’s first name.
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Agency : The name of the primary department or agency that houses any sublevel bu-
reaus or offices. The primary department is either the Executive Office of the President
(EOP), the name of the cabinet department that houses the appointee, or the name of
the agency outside the cabinet that houses the appointee. A list of all federal agencies
can be found at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/browse-gm-09.html or an organi-
zation chart can be found at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=2009_government_manual&docid=217558tx_xxx-2.pdf, p. 21. For most resumes
the department category will be easy to code since the resumes are grouped by department.
All printed resumes from the same department are grouped together. All electronic resumes
usually have a file name that indicates the department. The only exceptions are resumes for
appointees working in agencies in the EOP. EOP agencies include the Council of Economic
Advisers, Council on Environmental Quality, National Security Council, Office of Adminis-
tration, Office of Management and Budget, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and Office of the United States Trade Representative.
Bureau: The name of the next-lowest level of organization if they work in one. For Cabi-
net departments, this is often a bureau or office. Sometimes it is a grouping of bureaus or
programs under an under- or assistant secretary. For example, the Department of Justice
includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration. Alternatively, the Department of Agriculture has a major sub-unit
titled Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services. An undersecretary of Agriculture runs this
sub-unit which includes both the Farm Service Agency and the Foreign Agricultural Service.
Sublevel : A third level of organization, listing the name of a specific division, office, or board
within a bureau. This would include the Farm Service Agency and the Foreign Agricultural
Service listed above. It would also, in some cases, list smaller organization units depending
upon the size of the agency involved. For example, within the Broadcasting Board of Gover-
nors is the International Broadcasting Bureau includes both an Office of Cuba Broadcasting
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and an Office of External Relations.
Title: The official title of the appointee. This information is gleaned from the Federal Yellow
Book or the Plum Book except for a few agencies where this information was provided by
the agency (e.g., Department of Energy).
Appointment Type: The type of appointment: “PAS” = Presidential Appointment with
Senate Confirmation; “NA” = Non-Career Senior Executive Service Appointment; “SC”
= Schedule C Excepted Appointment; “PA” = Presidential Appointment (without Senate
Confirmation). This information is gleaned from the Federal Yellow Book or the Plum
Book except for a few agencies where this information was provided by the agency (e.g.,
Department of Energy).
Education Level (0,1,2,3,4): Highest education level completed. Coded with a 0 if no educa-
tion listed, a 1 if achieved Bachelor’s level degree, a 2 if achieved Master’s level degree (e.g.,
MBA, JD, MA, MS), a 3 if M.D./M.Phil level or ABD, and a 4 if PhD level.
Graduate Degrees : List the graduate degrees earned. For example, MA, JD, MBA, MPA,
PHD, MPhil.
Undergraduate university : Name of the person’s undergraduate university.
Federal (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has worked in the Executive Branch (or an
agency) of the Federal Government prior to their first appointment in the administration in
which they serve (i.e., Bush or Obama). Part-time work, internships or volunteer activities
do not count.
PrevAgency (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has previously worked in the agency to
which they have been appointed and a 0 otherwise. This should only be coded with a 1 if
the appointee worked in the agency as an employee prior to the start of the administration
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that appointed them. Part-time work, internships or volunteer activities do not count.
So, for example, if an appointee previously worked as an appointed chief of staff in the
Department of Energy prior to being appointed as a deputy assistant secretary, their work
as chief of staff should NOT be coded as prior work in the agency. Only work in the agency
prior to their first appointment in the current administration should lead them to be coded
with a 1.
Subject1 (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has previous work or educational experience
(i.e., graduate degree) in the same subject area as the core policy mission of the agency to
which they are appointed. An undergraduate major in same subject area should NOT be
coded as subject area expertise. This is for work done prior to appointment in the agency.
This may include experience in other government agencies, but excludes work in relevant
congressional committees.
For example, appointees in the Department of Labor would receive a 1 here if their biography
included experience in any of the following: a labor union, a state-level labor department,
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (or similar agency), or teaching
position in a relevant area such as labor law, industrial relations, or labor economics.
Determining whether the appointee has subject area expertise is perhaps the most difficult
coding decision to be made. All questions should be referred to the principal investigator.
Task (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has previous work or educational experience
(graduate degree) in the same work area as the job to which they are appointed (e.g.,
management, speechwriting, public relations). This is for work done prior to appointment
in the agency.
For example, if a person has experience working on the campaign as a press officer and then
assumes a similar position in the federal agency, this should be coded with a 1. Similarly,
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if person worked as a lobbyist prior to their appointment to a position as a congressional
liaison, this should be coded with a 1.
This should only be coded with a 1 if there is clear evidence that that person has the
appropriate task expertise. In the case of special assistant or confidential assistants, persons
should have worked in a similar role prior to appointment.
White House (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the person previously worked in the White House for
the same administration in which the person received an appointment and 0 otherwise. This
must be work as a full time employee. Work as an intern or part-time employee should be
coded with a 0. So, if a person worked in the Obama White House prior to their appointed
job in the Obama administration, this would be coded with a 1. Someone who worked in
the Clinton White House would receive a 0.
For this variable, positions in the White House Office should be coded with a 1, while
positions in other EOP offices should be coded with a 0. For the breakdown of which offices
are part of the White House Office, see: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/
eop/. For example, someone working in the White House Personnel office would receive a 1,
but a special assistant to the US Trade Representative would receive a 0.
Congress (0, LA, SA, Committee): Coded with LC (Legislative Correspondent), LA (Leg-
islative Assistant), SA (Staff Assistant), LD (Legislative Director), Counsel (Legislative
or General Counsel), Committee (Committee Staff), CS (Chief of Staff), PS (Press sec-
retary/communications director) or MC (Member of Congress) if the appointee has worked
in Congress and a 0 otherwise.
This includes experience as a member of Congress, as committee staff, and personal staff.
Persons who only worked in institutional staff agencies such as the Congressional Budget
Office, the old Office of Technology Assessment, or the Botanical Garden are coded with a
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0. Persons who only served as a legislative fellow (e.g. APSA Congressional Fellowship),
intern, page are coded with a 0. Persons only serving on congressional campaigns or campaign
committees (e.g., DCCC, RSCC) are coded with a 0.
Member or Committee Name (0,1): The name of the member or committee that employed
the person. List all in the order of service if there is more than one.
Public (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has public management experience prior
to their appointment in the agency and a 0 otherwise. This only includes high-ranking
positions in federal, state, or local government agencies (secretaries, under secretaries, deputy
secretaries), as well as directors of smaller bureaus and offices. For politicians, executive
positions like mayors and governors receive a 1, but legislators do not. For military officers,
a position at the rank of colonel or above (captain for Navy) would receive a 1. Lieutenant
colonel and below (commander in the Navy) would receive a 0.
State Work Experience: Lists work at the state level—(EL) elected official; (LB) worked in
legislature; (EB) worked in executive branch. Those with no work experience at the state
level are coded with a 0.
Private (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has private management experience and a 0
otherwise. This is limited to presidents, vice presidents, CEOs, CFOs, managing partners,
or similarly-titled positions of any privately owned business. Remember, the focus here is
on for-profit businesses.
This does NOT include management of universities, political organizations, non-managing
partners of law firms, board members of companies, center directors, PACs, or other business
organizations that are not for-profit firms (e.g., President of the Chamber of Commerce).
Not-for-profit (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has management experience in the
not-for profit sector and a 0 otherwise. This should be a full-time job where the person gives
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policy direction to the organization.
This does NOT include management of political organizations such as PACs or campaigns.
It does NOT include non-managing partners of law firms, board members of non-profits,
department chairs, center directors, or campus organizations. Work as a board member in
any not-for-profit does NOT qualify.
For simplicity, provosts, deans, or presidents of universities are included in this category,
even if they managed a publically-funded school.
If a person served as vice-president of the Red Cross, Director of the Alabama chapter of
the Sierra Club, or president of the Kiwanis, they would be coded with a 1.
Appointee (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the person has held an appointed position in a previous
administration and 0 otherwise.
So, for example, an appointee in the Obama administration with only a previous appointed
job in the Obama Administration would be coded with a 0. A person with an appointed job
in the Clinton Administration would be coded with a 1.
CurrentAppointee: Includes the location (e.g., Department of Defense, Federal Communica-
tions Commission) of previous executive branch appointments in the current administration
(Obama administration if appointed by Obama, or Bush administration if appointed by
Bush) listed on their resume and 0 otherwise. This coding should be completely differ-
ent from the previous column since that previous column deals with appointed positions in
previous administrations.
AppthisAdmin: Coded with position of previous executive branch appointment in the current
administration (if CurrentAppointee includes the location of a position, this should be the
matching position) and 0 otherwise.
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Political (0,1): Coded 1 if the person’s last job/activity prior to their initial appointment
in the administration was in politics and 0 otherwise. This includes work for: Political
campaigns, Members of Congress, a political party, political official (e.g., governor, political
appointee, etc.), government affairs office for a firm or organization, a PAC or lobbying firm,
or other political group.
So, for example, if an appointee previously worked as an appointed chief of staff in the
Department of Energy prior to being appointed as a deputy assistant secretary, their work
as chief of staff should NOT be coded as political. For the purposes of this variable political
is only coded if their last job previous to appointment in the Bush or Obama administration
was in politics. That is, was their last job before joining the administration a job in politics?
Persons recruited into the administration from jobs in Congress, a PAC, government affairs
for a private corporation, the party, or an elected position would be coded. Internships
or volunteer work in a political position would be coded a 1 as well (e.g. a recent college
graduate who interned in Congress).
Campaign (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the resume indicates that person worked or volunteered
for the Obama for America campaign or Bush-Cheney Campaign and 0 otherwise.
State/Role: Lists the position of the person on the campaign. Some examples include
volunteer, state director for Florida, National Finance Chair, etc.
PrevCamp: Count of the number of previous political campaigns (including any coded in
the Campaign variable) the person lists on their resume. This includes work as a volunteer
or paid staff. This includes not only presidential campaigns but other campaigns as well
(House, Senate, mayoral, etc.).
Transition (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee worked on President-elect’s Transition
Team and 0 otherwise. This does not include work for the inaugural committee or inaugu-
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ration.
Inauguration (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee worked for the inaugural committee or
inauguration.
Party (0,1): Coded with a 1 if the appointee has ever worked for the Republican or Demo-
cratic political party and 0 otherwise. This includes work at the state or national level. For
example, work for the party at the National Party Convention would qualify. This can also
include work for the College Republicans or Democrats, or for the parties’ House or Senate
campaign committees (DSCC/DCCC; NRSC/NRCC).
Details : Lists party position(s) of candidate.
Elected Official(0,1): Coded with a 1 if the person has ever held elected office prior to their
appointment.
142
